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ABSTENTION AT THE BORDER
Maggie Gardner*
The lower federal courts have been invoking "international comity
abstention" to solve a range of problems in cross-border cases, using
a wide array of tests that vary not just across the circuits, but within
them as well. That confusion will only grow, as both scholars and the
Supreme Court have yet to clarify what exactly "international comity
abstention" entails. Meanwhile, the breadth of "international comity
abstention" stands in tension with the Supreme Court's recent
reemphasis on the federal judiciary's obligation to exercise congres-
sionally granted jurisdiction. Indeed, loose applications of "interna-
tional comity abstention" risk undermining not only the expressed
preferences of Congress, but the interests of the states as well.
This Article argues against "international comity abstention" both as
a label and as a generic doctrine. As a label, it leads courts to con-
flate abstention with other comity doctrines that are not about absten-
tion at all. And as a generic doctrine, it encourages judges to decline
their jurisdiction too readily, in contrast to the presumption ofjuris-
dictional obligation. In lieu of a single broad doctrine of "interna-
tional comity abstention, " then, this Article urges federal judges to
specify more narrow grounds for abstention in transnational cases-
grounds that can be separately justified, candidly addressed, and ana-
lyzed through judicially manageable frameworks. For example, a
primary basis for "international comity abstention" has been defer-
ence to parallel proceedings in foreign courts, a common problem
that deserves its own dedicated analytical framework. A separate doc-
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trine for deferring to integrated foreign remedial schemes may also be
appropriate. Perhaps other limited bases for transnational abstention
could be identified as well. The goal should not be a strict formalism
that insists that judges' hands are tied, but rather a channeling ofju-
dicial discretion so as to promote-rather than displace-interbranch
dialogue about the proper role of comity in the courts.
INTRODUCTION ................................................... 64
I. TENSION AT THE BORDER. ........................................ 73
A. Domestic Abstention and the Critique ofPrudential
Restraint ........................................ 74
B. Is Transnational Litigation Different? ........ ........... 81
1. The Limited Exceptionalism of Transnational Litigation ..... 81
2. Avoiding Excessive Transnational Litigation ........... 84
C. Striking the Balance................................ 88
D. Designing Doctrines ................................ 90
II. THE PROBLEM WITH "INTERNATIONAL COMITY ABSTENTION".......93
A. Comity Is Not a Doctrine ........... ................. 94
B. Distinguishing Positive and Negative Comity: The
Recognition of Foreign Judgments .................... 96
C. Distinguishing Prescriptive and Adjudicative Comity:
Statutory Construction and Choice ofLaw ...... ........ 102
III. ABSTENTION IN TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION ................... 108
A. Problematic Grounds.............................. 110
1. Political Sensitivity ........................ ..... 110
2. Unsettled Foreign Law....................... 112
3. Party Convenience ...................... ........ 113
B. Better Bases for Abstention .............................. 115
1. Foreign Parallel Proceedings ................ ..... 116
2. Integrated Foreign Remedial Schemes ............... 121
IV. CONCLUSION ................................................. 125
INTRODUCTION
For the second time last Term, the Supreme Court heard a case that
the lower courts had dismissed based on "international comity absten-
tion."' And for the second time, the Court carefully avoided deciding
' See Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018);
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797 (1993).
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whether abstention based on international comity is legitimate, much
less what the parameters of such abstention would be.2 No one else
seems to know, either. The tests applied by the lower courts vary not
just across circuits, but within them as well.3 The courts are using differ-
ent tests because they are invoking "international comity abstention" to
address a range of different problems. Sometimes it is invoked to avoid
a potential conflict with foreign law, akin to the foreign-state compul-
sion defense.4 This category arguably includes both of the Supreme
Court cases, Animal Science Products v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceuti-
cal Co.5 and Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California.6 At other times,
and using a different set of factors, federal courts have invoked "interna-
tional comity abstention" to dismiss cases they fear are too politically
2 See Question Presented, Animal Sci. Prods., 138 S. Ct. 1865 (No. 16-1220),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/qp/16-01220qp.pdf [https://perma.cc
/6KVE-B72J] (granting certiorari but declining to address the question of "[w]hether a court
may abstain from exercising jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis, as a matter of discretionary
international comity, over an otherwise valid Sherman Antitrust Act claim involving purely
domestic injury"); see also Animal Sci. Prods., 138 S. Ct. at 1872 (answering only the nar-
row question on which the Court had granted certiorari).
The first instance was in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, where the Court
avoided deciding whether "in a proper case a court may decline to exercise Sherman Act
jurisdiction" on "grounds of international comity." Hartford, 509 U.S. at 798; see also id. at
799 ("We have no need in this litigation to address other considerations that might inform a
decision to refrain from the exercise of jurisdiction on grounds of international comity."). As
Justice Scalia noted in his dissent, although the Court did not use the term "abstention," it
framed the question as one of abstention (i.e., the voluntary declining of jurisdiction), as had
the lower courts. See id. at 818 n.9 (Scalia, J., dissenting). What the Court actually did in
Hartford is notoriously hard to parse; that puzzle is explored further below in Section II.C.
3 Compare Royal & Sun All. Ins. Co. of Can. v. Century Int'l Arms, Inc., 466 F.3d 88, 94
(2d Cir. 2006) (considering eight factors), with In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d
175, 184-85 (2d Cir. 2016) (considering a different set of ten factors); compare Ungaro-
Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004) (weighing "the
strength of the United States' interest in using a foreign forum, the strength of the foreign
governments' interests, and the adequacy of the alternative forum"), with Turner Entm't v.
Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1518 (11th Cir. 1994) (weighing "international comi-
ty; ... fairness to litigants; and . . . efficient use of scarce judicial resources"); compare also
Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 603-08 (9th Cir. 2014) (Bybee, J.) (setting out at least
twelve factors for evaluating international comity abstention), with Cooper v. Tokyo Elec.
Power Co., 860 F.3d 1193, 1205-09 (9th Cir. 2017) (Bybee, J.) (not applying all of the sub-
factors identified in Mujica).
4 For further discussion of the foreign-state compulsion defense and the categorization of
Animal Science Products and Hartford Insurance, see Section II.C below. Given that these
cases were more about conflicts of law than abstention, the Supreme Court was wise not to
use them to address the tricky question of "international comity abstention."
5 138 S. Ct. at 1865.
6 509 U.S. at 764.
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sensitive,7 a sort of addendum to the political question doctrine or a var-
iant of foreign affairs preemption.8 For example, the Ninth Circuit in
Mujica v. AirScan, Inc.9 used "international comity abstention" to dis-
miss state-law claims in a human rights suit based primarily on a con-
cern that the case would harm U.S. foreign relations.10 At yet other
times, courts invoke "international comity abstention" to stay or dismiss
cases in light of parallel litigation in foreign courts." Though this is the
least controversial use of "international comity abstention," even here
the lower courts are divided as to the appropriate standard to apply.12
Nor is there any authoritative secondary source on what "international
comity abstention" entails; what minimal scholarly attention it has re-
ceived so far has been fleeting, fragmented, and inconclusive.13
7 See, e.g., Mujica, 771 F.3d at 615; Ungaro-Benages, 379 F.3d at 1240. But see Gross v.
German Found. Indus. Initiative, 456 F.3d 363, 393-94 (3d Cir. 2006) (refusing to apply in-
ternational comity abstention as a means of avoiding a politically sensitive case).
8 I am skeptical of abstention based on such amorphous political sensitivities. See infra
Subsection III.A.1.
9 771 F.3d at 580.
10 Id. at 609-12; see also Ungaro-Benages, 379 F.3d at 1238 (applying a different three-
factor test for international comity abstention based on foreign relations concerns).
11 See, e.g., Royal & Sun All. Ins. Co. of Can. v. Century Int'l Arms, Inc., 466 F.3d 88, 92,
94-97 (2d Cir. 2006) (declining to apply international comity abstention despite foreign pro-
ceedings); Finova Capital Corp. v. Ryan Helicopters U.S.A., Inc., 180 F.3d 896, 898, 901
(7th Cir. 1999) (affirming stay in light of foreign parallel proceedings).
12 See infra Subection ll1.B. 1.
13 Most scholars who have discussed international comity abstention have treated it as a
doctrine that addresses foreign parallel proceedings. See infra note 247 (gathering sources).
But as this Article describes, courts are invoking international comity abstention far beyond
that context. Others have briefly noted international comity abstention as part of larger
works mapping federal procedure in transnational litigation. See Pamela K. Bookman, Liti-
gation Isolationism, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 1081, 1096-97 (2015); William S. Dodge, International
Comity in American Law, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 2071, 2112-14 (2015) [hereinafter Dodge,
International Comity in American Law]. Professors William Dodge and Paul Stephan, in a
scholarly amicus brief, challenged the Second Circuit's application of international comity
abstention in the Animal Science Products case, though their critique was necessarily limited
by the context of that case. See Brief of Professors William S. Dodge and Paul B. Stephan as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Animal Sci. Prods., 138 S. Ct. 1865 (No. 16-1220).
Finally, Professors Donald Childress InI and Michael Ramsey have analyzed some of the
abstention cases gathered here, but in articles that address the "doctrine of comity" more
broadly. See Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity
as Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 11 (2010); Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping "Inter-
national Comity," 83 Iowa L. Rev. 893 (1998). As I argue in this Article, talking about a
broad "doctrine of comity" is the source of much confusion about international comity ab-
stention. See infra Part II.
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In short, "international comity abstention" is an amorphous and mal-
leable tool that allows the federal courts to decline jurisdiction in a wide
array of cases for a wide variety of reasons. In addition to inviting un-
certainty and inconsistency, that open-ended use of abstention in trans-
national cases is in tension with the Supreme Court's renewed emphasis
on the "virtually unflagging obligation" of the federal courts "to exercise
the jurisdiction given them" by Congress.14 This presumption of juris-
dictional obligation is of course not new,' 5 nor is the debate over how
far it extends. 16 The Court has never fully endorsed Professor Martin
Redish's famous argument that judicial abdication is illegitimate.17 But
in the time since Professor David Shapiro's equally famous rejoinder-
that federal courts traditionally have exercised discretion in smoothing
out the edges of their jurisdiction"-the Court has been busy curtailing
the very prudential doctrines on which Shapiro's defense of discretion
relied. 19 As others have noted,20 the Court has signaled a retreat from
14 Col0. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). For
discussion of this trend, see Section I.A below.
1s See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996) ("We have often
acknowledged that federal courts have a strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is con-
ferred upon them by Congress."); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of
New Orleans (NOPSI), 491 U.S. 350, 358 (1989) ("Our cases have long supported the prop-
osition that federal courts lack the authority to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that
has been conferred."); England v. La. State Bd. of Medical Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415
(1964) ('When a Federal court is properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law
jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such jurisdiction. . . .' (quoting Willcox v. Consol. Gas
Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909))); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) ("We
have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that
which is not given."); see also Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen
Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, 558 U.S. 67, 71 (2009) (noting that "there is surely a starting
presumption that when jurisdiction is conferred, a court may not decline to exercise it").
16 See Fred 0. Smith, Jr., Undemocratic Restraint, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 845, 871-74 (2017)
(summarizing debate since the 1920s).
" See Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial
Function, 94 Yale L.J. 71 (1984); see also Martin H. Redish, Intersystemic Redundancy and
Federal Court Power: Proposing a Zero Tolerance Solution to the Duplicative Litigation
Problem, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1347, 1370 (2000) [hereinafter Redish, Intersystemic Re-
dundancy and Federal Court Power] (recognizing the Supreme Court has declined to accept
this argument).
1 David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 545 (1985).
19 See id. at 550-55 (discussing, inter alia, abstention, standing, and ripeness doctrines as
traditional examples ofjudicial discretion to decline jurisdiction).
20 See Joel S. Nolette, Last Stand for Prudential Standing? Lexmark and Its Implications,
16 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 227, 230-32, 237-39, 242-51 (2018); Smith, supra note 16, at
855-65; Leading Cases - Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
128 Harv. L. Rev. 321, 322, 328-29 (2014); see also John F. Manning, The Supreme Court,
68 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 105:63
domestic doctrines of abstention,21 cast doubt on prudential standing and
ripeness requirements,22 and emphasized the narrowness of the political
question doctrine.23 When judges decline to exercise the jurisdiction
they otherwise have, the Court has warned, they encroach on Congress's
prerogative to set the jurisdiction of the federal courts.24 Underlying the
Court's recent wariness of prudential doctrines, in other words, is a sep-
aration-of-powers concern that these doctrines of "judicial restraint"
have only served to increase judicial power.25
2013 Term-Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 73 n.415
(2014) (noting the Court's retreat from abstention and prudential standing doctrines).
21 Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 593-94 (2013) (clarifying narrow lim-
its of Younger extension); Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 731 (1996) (ex-
plaining that "federal courts have the power to dismiss or remand cases based on abstention
principles only where the relief being sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary"); see
also Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1156-57 (2017) (So-
tomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that "this Court has repeatedly emphasized
that certification offers clear advantages over [Pullman] abstention").
22 See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386-87,
1387 n.3 (2014) (clarifying that concepts "previously classified as an aspect of 'prudential
standing' are better understood as requirements of Article I standing (e.g., generalized
grievances) or as an act of statutory interpretation (e.g., the zone-of-interests test)); see also
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2347 (2014) (declining to consider "the
continuing vitality of the prudential ripeness doctrine" but suggesting that Lexmark and
Sprint drew that continuing vitality into question).
23 See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 194-95 (2012) (discussing only two factors of
the political question doctrine while emphasizing that the doctrine is but "a narrow excep-
tion" to the "responsibility to decide cases properly before" the courts); see also id. at 1431-
34 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (categorizing the fac-
tors omitted by the majority as addressing prudential concerns).
24 See, e.g., Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1388 (cautioning that a court "cannot limit a cause of
action that Congress has created merely because 'prudence' dictates"); NOPSI, 491 U.S.
350, 359 (1989) ("Underlying these assertions [of required exercise of jurisdiction] is the
undisputed constitutional principle that Congress, and not the Judiciary, defines the scope of
federal jurisdiction within the constitutionally permissible bounds."); see also Patchak v.
Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 906 (2018) (reaffirming that Congress's control of the federal courts'
jurisdiction is an essential component of the separation of powers); William P. Marshall,
Abstention, Separation of Powers, and Recasting the Meaning of Judicial Restraint, 107 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 881, 883, 892, 896-98 (2013) (describing how Redish's position did not gain ad-
herents but asserting that it "changed the way that the meaning of judicial restraint was con-
ceptualized" along these lines).
25 For scholars making this argument in light of prudential doctrines, see, for example,
Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. Co-
lo. L. Rev. 1395, 1396, 1418 (1999) (criticizing what he terms the "foreign relations effects
test" as purporting to protect political branch prerogatives in foreign affairs but in fact em-
powering the courts); Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question Doc-
trine, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1908, 1913 (2015) (arguing that the modem political question doc-
trine is "not ... a doctrine of judicial restraint (or subservience), but ... a source of judicial
Abstention at the Border
This Article critiques the lower courts' wide-ranging use of "interna-
tional comity abstention" in light of the Supreme Court's recent re-
emphasis on jurisdictional obligation as a bulwark for the separation of
powers. That concern for jurisdictional obligation does not stop at the
border: judges should be equally skeptical of a broad and amorphous
doctrine of abstention in transnational cases just as they would be in
domestic cases. The label "international comity abstention" (and all of
its variantS 26) is problematically generic and inherently confusing as
"comity" is not a unitary doctrine. 27 This vague label has led courts to
conflate different comity doctrines, inviting expansive abstention that is
out of step with the Court's professed concern for judicial restraint.
The goals of this Article, then, are threefold. Descriptively, it pro-
vides the first comprehensive account and critique of the federal courts'
use of "international comity abstention." Prescriptively, it aims to clarify
the federal courts' current practice and to outline a more restrained path
forward. In particular, I urge federal judges to drop the amorphous label
of "international comity abstention" and to identify instead distinct ba-
ses for abstention in transnational cases-much as they have in domestic
cases-that can then be distinctly analyzed. Doing so will discourage
undisciplined abstention while identifying gaps for which more specific
doctrines should be developed.
power"); see also Leading Cases, supra note 20, at 328 (noting the Court's apparent view
that "[pirudential standing ... can be used by courts as a tool of nearly unfettered policy dis-
cretion"); cf. Curtis A. Bradley, The Irrepressible Functionalism in U.S. Foreign Relations
Law, in U.S. Foreign Relations Law 12-16 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., forthcoming 2019),
https:/ssm.com/abstract-3228497 [https://perma.cc/N75M-BN3C] (suggesting that the Su-
preme Court's recent first-order formalism in some foreign relations doctrines has been justi-
fied by second-order functionalism, including separation-of-powers concerns).
26 The courts have not been entirely consistent even in their labeling of this concept. See,
e.g., Cooper v. Tokyo Elec. Power Co., 860 F.3d 1193, 1205 (9th Cir. 2017) ("dis-
miss[al] ... on comity grounds"); Royal & Sun All. Ins. Co. of Can. v. Century Int'l Arms,
Inc., 466 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2006) ("international comity abstention"); Ungaro-Benages v.
Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004) ("International comity. .. is an
abstention doctrine. . . ."); Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1222 (11th Cir. 1999)
(per curiam) ("international abstention"). For purposes of collecting federal court practice
for this Article, I have included as examples of "international comity abstention" those deci-
sions that used this label (or a close variant), as well as cases that applied abstention princi-
ples (even if not identified as such) that are framed in terms of international comity.
27 Rather, it is a multivalent interest that informs a range of doctrines. See infra Section
II.A (discussing different facets of "comity").
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The resulting analytical framework will be a familiar one for the
Court, akin to its unanimous rejection in Taylor v. Sturgell28 of "virtual
representation" in preclusion doctrine.29 The starting point is a strong
default rule: here, the presumption that federal courts should exercise
the jurisdiction granted by Congress. There may be exceptions to that
default, but those exceptions should be narrow and defined with particu-
larity. A broad, amorphous exception (like "international comity absten-
tion") risks undermining the default rule, denying due process to liti-
gants, and imposing unnecessary analytical burdens on judges.30 But as
in Taylor, this is not an inflexible approach; additional exceptions may
be identified and developed as needed. This approach only requires that
such exceptions be tailored and transparent. 1
This analytical structure is a pragmatic formalism, one that accounts
for the institutional and psychological pressures of judicial decision
making without disclaiming all judicial discretion. This is the third,
normative goal of the Article: to advocate for such pragmatic formalism
in treating procedural questions. If the goal is judicial humility vis-d-vis
the other branches, that goal can be undermined not only by open-ended
discretion, but also by firm rules that declare judges' hands to be tied. 3 2
Strict formalism-because it is defined and enforced by judges--can
shut down helpful dialogue between the component parts of govern-
ment. 3 3 The better approach is not to deny all ability to abstain in trans-
28 553 U.S. 880 (2008).
29 See id. at 885. I am grateful to Professor Robin Effron for identifying this analytical
analogy.
30 See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 898-901 (critiquing "virtual representation" on these grounds).
31 The Court followed a similar structure in another unanimous opinion that was also au-
thored by Justice Ginsburg and is both more recent and more closely related: Sprint Commu-
nications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584 (2013). In Sprint, however, the Court did not leave
space for a residual category like it did in Taylor; under Sprint, Younger abstention was
strictly limited to three previously recognized and specific grounds. Id. at 591 (stating these
three "exceptional" categories "define Younger's scope"). Perhaps forty years from now, the
courts will similarly feel they have identified all legitimate categories of transnational ab-
stention. For now, however, it seems prudent to leave some space for courts to identify addi-
tional (but carefully circumscribed) grounds for abstention in transnational cases.
32 Cf. James E. Pfander, Scalia's Legacy: Originalism and Change in the Law of Standing,
6 Br. J. Am. Legal Stud. 85 (2017) (critiquing Justice Scalia's standing decisions for "exer-
cis[ing] a form of judicial power that he had been quick to decry in other settings[:] He de-
ployed his own conception of the proper limits on government action as the basis for invali-
dating choices made by the political representatives of the people").
3 My thinking on this dynamic has been greatly influenced by the recent work of Profes-
sors Harlan Cohen and Fred Smith, Jr. See Harlan Grant Cohen, A Politics-Reinforcing Po-
litical Question Doctrine, 49 Ariz. St. L.J. 1 (2017); Smith, supra note 16. I am also grateful
[Vol. 105:6370
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national cases, but to precisely identify and defend grounds for such ab-
stention in a manner that invites intervention by the other branches.
The discussion here should thus be of practical interest to federal
judges and those who appear before them, but it bears on a broader
range of conversations as well. For those interested in international
commerce and private international law, this doctrinal clarification will
add much-needed clarity and predictability to judicial decision making.3 4
For those interested in human rights litigation, the currently muddled
doctrine of "international comity abstention" is an obstacle to state
courts and state law being able to fill the void left by Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co.3 5 And for those concerned about the domestic di-
vision of power within our constitutional system, the current approach to
abstention in transnational cases unnecessarily aggrandizes the federal
judicial power at the expense of Congress and the states.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the Supreme Court's
continuing ambivalence about abstention and its recent re-emphasis on
jurisdictional obligation. It argues that the presumption of jurisdictional
obligation applies to transnational litigation as well. Even though the
federal government-and the Executive in particular-has a special
claim to foreign policy expertise, all branches of the government as well
as the states have some role to play in managing transnational litigation.
Further, the presumption of jurisdictional obligation, as applied to trans-
national cases, does not necessarily conflict with the Supreme Court's
recent interest in curtailing transnational litigation.36 Part I concludes by
considering what the presumption of jurisdictional obligation might then
tell us about the appropriate scope of abstention in transnational cases.
for an illuminating conversation with Professor Nelson Tebbe on this theme. For further dis-
cussion, see Section I.C below.
34 Cf. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, supra note 13, at 2131 (arguing that
phrasing comity doctrines in rule-like terms will further commercial convenience and better
effectuate foreign interests by increasing predictability).
35 569 U.S. 108 (2013). On the importance of state courts and state-law claims for the fu-
ture of human rights litigation in the United States, see, for example, Roger P. Alford, The
Future of Human Rights Litigation After Kiobel, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1749, 1763 (2014);
Seth Davis & Christopher A. Whytock, State Remedies for Human Rights, 98 B.U. L. Rev.
397, 399-401 (2018); Christopher A. Whytock et al., After Kiobel-International Human
Rights Litigation in State Courts and Under State Law, 3 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (2013);
see also Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of
Transnational Litigation, 100 Geo. L.J. 709, 739-41 (2012) (noting likely turn to state courts
in human rights litigation).
36 See, e.g., Bookman, supra note 13, at 1084-85, 1088-1100 (describing this trend).
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On the one hand, if overextended as an absolute rule, the presumption of
jurisdictional obligation risks undermining the very separation-of-
powers interests it is meant to promote. Some flexibility is needed. On
the other hand, poorly designed exceptions may encourage expansive or
lopsided doctrinal development over time.37 My worry is that vaguely
defined bases for transnational abstention will inevitably lead to more
dismissals-and the assertion of greater judicial power-than judges ini-
tially intend. In lieu of a single, broad doctrine of abstention for transna-
tional cases, I argue, judges should identify a few specific, narrow bases
for abstention that can be reliably evaluated through judicially manage-
able standards.
Turning from theory to practice, Part II argues against the federal
courts' currently broad conception of "international comity abstention."
First, it explains that "comity" is not itself a doctrine; rather, it is a prin-
ciple that informs multiple doctrines, and it can point in different direc-
tions depending on the question being asked. The danger of the label of
"comity abstention," then, is that it encourages judges to conflate ab-
stention with other comity-based doctrines that are not about abstention
at all. Indeed, federal judges have drawn on other comity-inflected doc-
trines-like the recognition of foreign judgments, statutory construction,
and conflicts of law-to try to fill in the currently amorphous content of
"international comity abstention." The rest of Part II shows how this
conflation has occurred, how it risks confusing judicial decision making,
and how it may also lead to the displacement of state law by federal
judge-made law.
Disentangling these other comity doctrines has the additional benefit
of clarifying how the need for abstention in transnational cases is nar-
rower than might at first appear. Part III considers, then, what grounds
for abstention remain. It argues against basing abstention in transnation-
al cases on generalized functional concerns, such as the unsettled nature
of foreign law, political sensitivities, or the personal convenience of the
parties. Such broad and indeterminate grounds for abstention will inevi-
tably expand over time, undermining the default presumption of juris-
dictional obligation.
3" Here I draw on prior work exploring the evolution of procedural doctrines in the context
of complexity and uncertainty. See Maggie Gardner, Parochial Procedure, 69 Stan. L. Rev.
941, 958-67 (2017) [hereinafter Gardner, Parochial Procedure]; Maggie Gardner, Retiring
Forum Non Conveniens, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 390, 417-29 (2017) [hereinafter Gardner, Retir-
ing Forum Non Conveniens].
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There are, however, other bases for abstention that do not raise the
same risks. In particular, Part III recognizes that there is a real need for
abstention in transnational litigation to address foreign parallel proceed-
ings-the major current use of international comity abstention that
should be salvaged, clarified, and renamed. It also considers a potential
new category for transnational abstention, loosely analogous to Burford
abstention in domestic cases, to defer to foreign consolidated remedial
schemes for resolving interdependent claims.
Part IV concludes by considering how the dialogue between Congress
and the courts regarding transnational abstention might continue to
evolve, particularly through the development of private international law
treaties. By leaving space for Congress to supplement or supplant judi-
cial practice, the approach to abstention and doctrinal design urged here
may do more to promote judicial humility than would an absolute denial
of all discretion.
I. TENSION AT THE BORDER
This Part juxtaposes two trends at the Supreme Court. It begins by
describing the Court's renewed embrace of jurisdictional obligation: that
even if courts are not constitutionally required to exercise the full scope
of jurisdiction assigned to them by Congress, it is nonetheless suspect
when they decline to do so. 38 It then argues that this presumption ex-
tends to transnational litigation, despite the Supreme Court's recent in-
. . .39terest in limiting transnational cases in U.S. courts.
The Part concludes, however, with a warning against applying the
presumption of jurisdictional obligation too rigidly. Enforcing jurisdic-
tional obligation through strict rules may lead to judicial aggrandize-
ment in a different form: judicial pronouncements of what the Constitu-
tion requires, or what Congress must say specifically to overcome court-
imposed limits, can serve to constrain rather than to empower Congress
and the states.40 In considering how transnational abstention doctrines
might be designed to better account for the presumption of jurisdictional
obligation, I argue not for avoiding all abstention, but for limiting it to
discrete, judicially manageable bases.4 1
" See infra Section I.A.
39 See infra Section I.B.
40 See infra Section I.C.
41 See infra Section I.D.
2019] 73
Virginia Law Review
A. Domestic Abstention and the Critique ofPrudential Restraint
In the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court articulated a series
of abstention doctrines meant primarily to protect state interests from
federal encroachment.42 From the outset, however, the Court's willing-
ness to abdicate congressionally granted jurisdiction has found many
critics, including among its own members. More recently, the Court has
embraced these concerns-particularly those sounding in the separation
of powers-in emphasizing the limits of abstention and signaling a re-
treat from other doctrines of prudential restraint.
Pullman abstention: The abstention doctrine first recognized in Rail-
road Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.4 3 allows federal courts to ab-
stain in cases where the only way to avoid a constitutional question
would be to resolve unsettled state law. Nearly since its inception, how-
ever, critics have worried that too much abstention, even when limited
to the courts' equitable powers,44 would undercut Congress's direction
to hear these cases. Shortly after Pullman, the Supreme Court clarified
that a question of state law that is "uncertain or difficult to determine" is
not by itself a reason to abstain; some additional concern, like the avoid-
ance of a constitutional question, is required. Otherwise abstention
would "thwart the purpose" of the diversity jurisdiction granted by Con-
gresS4 5-which, after all, "was not conferred for the benefit of the feder-
al courts or to serve their convenience." 46
Over the last twenty-five years, Pullman abstention has been largely
displaced by statutes permitting federal courts to certify questions of
state law to state courts.47 As of 2010, all states but North Carolina had
such certification statutes, though the breadth and process of certifica-
42 See, e.g., La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959) (noting
that abstention is a tool for maintaining "harmonious federal-state relations"); R.R. Comm'n
of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) ("This use of equitable powers is a contri-
bution of the courts in furthering the harmonious relation between state and federal authority
without the need of rigorous congressional restriction of those powers.").
43 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
4 See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500-01 (grounding Pullman abstention in equitable powers).
45 Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235-36 (1943).
46 Id. at 234.
47 See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75-77, 79 (1997) (noting
that "[c]ertification today covers territory once dominated by" Pullman abstention and that
certification does not "entail the delays, expense, and procedural complexity that generally
attend abstention decisions").
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tion varies.4 8 And the Supreme Court has encouraged the lower courts to
use certification in lieu of abstention; as Justice Sotomayor recently ex-
plained, the Court "has repeatedly emphasized that certification offers
clear advantages over abstention," rendering abstention a less favored
device for furthering "cooperative judicial federalism."'9
Burford and Thibodaux abstention: The abstention doctrines estab-
lished by Burford v. Sun Oil Co.50 and Louisiana Power & Light Co. v.
City of Thibodaux5 ' both recognize a need for centralized decision mak-
ing in certain circumstances. Burford abstention applies when federal
review of a state-law question "would be disruptive of state efforts to es-
tablish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public
concer."5 2 As the Court later summarized in New Orleans Public Ser-
vice, Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans ('NOPSI"),53 abstention
based on Burford's rationale is only appropriate when there is a danger
that the federal court could "disrupt the State's attempt to ensure uni-
formity in the treatment of an 'essentially local problem. "'54 Similarly in
Thibodaux, the Supreme Court was concerned about resolving unsettled
questions of state law that implicate the state's sovereign prerogatives,
such as the state's eminent domain power. 5 There are some topics so
bound up with the state's sovereignty (particularly its territorial sover-
eignty), Thibodaux seems to suggest, that federal courts should allow
state courts to resolve such questions in the first instance.
Both Burford and Thibodaux were close decisions issued over strong
dissents that warned that judicial abdication in such cases could under-
48 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Feder-
al System 1116 n.6 (7th ed. 2015).
4' Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1157 (2017) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (citing Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 75; Virginia
v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 396 (1988); Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S.
386, 391 (1974)).
50319 U.S. 315 (1943).
* 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
52 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976) (sum-
marizing Burford).
5 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
54 Id. at 362 (quoting Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 347
(1951)) (emphases added).
* Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 28 (noting both that eminent domain power "is intimately in-
volved with sovereign prerogative" and that the question of eminent domain in that case fur-
ther "concern[ed] the apportionment of governmental powers between City and State"-
another matter of state sovereign prerogative).
2019] 75
mine the congressional grant of diversity jurisdiction. 5 6 Justice Frankfur-
ter, who had authored Pullman, was nonetheless adamant in Burford that
the lack of a constitutional question made abstention in the face of un-
settled state law an unacceptable intrusion on congressional power. "It is
the essence of diversity jurisdiction that federal judges and juries should
pass on asserted claims," he insisted, "because the result might be dif-
ferent if they were decided by a state court." 57 "The duty of the judiciary
is to exercise the jurisdiction which Congress has conferred," he con-
cluded, not to write its own view of jurisdictional policy into law.58
Likewise, Justice Brennan's dissent in Thibodaux warned that overex-
tension of abstention would "wreak havoc with federal jurisdiction."5 9
"Until Congress speaks otherwise," he urged, "the federal judiciary has
no choice but conscientiously to render justice for litigants from differ-
ent States entitled to have their controversies adjudicated in the federal
courts."6 o
Colorado River abstention: The Supreme Court in Colorado River
Water Conservation District v. United States 61 recognized (though with-
out using the label of "abstention" 62) that federal courts may defer to
parallel litigation in state courts.63 The circumstances in which a federal
court may do so must be "exceptional," however, given the federal
courts' "virtually unflagging obligation ... to exercise the jurisdiction
given them." 64 Even with that warning, Colorado River has been criti-
56 "To deny a suitor access to a federal district court under the circumstances of this case,"
Justice Frankfurter began his Burford dissent, "is to disregard a duty enjoined by Congress
and made manifest by the whole history of the jurisdiction of the United States courts based
upon diversity of citizenship between parties." Burford, 319 U.S. at 336 (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting).
" Id. at 344 (emphasis added).
58 Id. at 348.
5 Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 36 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
60 Id. at 41.
61 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
62 See id. at 813. Although the Court distinguished Colorado River from previously recog-
nized abstention doctrines, that distinction appears to be more historical than substantive; for
the sake of brevity, this Article refers to Colorado River deference as a form of abstention.
63 See id. at 817-18.
6 Id.; see also id. at 819 ("Only the clearest ofjustifications will warrant dismissal."); Mo-
ses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 19 (1983) (referring to
"Colorado River's exceptional-circumstances test"). Such exceptional circumstances include
(i) "the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation," (ii) "the order in which jurisdiction
was obtained by the concurrent forums," (iii) "the inconvenience of the federal forum," and
whether (iv) "the court first assuming jurisdiction over property may exercise that jurisdic-
tion to the exclusion of other courts." Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818. Other relevant fac-
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cized for elevating the administrative concerns of judges over the juris-
dictional directives of Congress.6 5
Younger abstention: Perhaps the most controversial branch of domes-
tic abstention has been the equitable restraint doctrine associated with
Younger v. Harris,66 under which the federal courts will generally not
hear claims for equitable relief against pending state criminal prosecu-
tions.67 At first, the category of cases subject to Younger abstention
seemed potentially limitless, 68 expanding to encompass civil enforce-
ment actions brought by the state69 and even some civil proceedings in
which the state was not a party.70
That expansion has ground to a halt, however. In NOPSI, Justice
Scalia emphasized "the undisputed constitutional principle that Con-
gress, and not the Judiciary, defines the scope of federal jurisdiction,"
with Younger abstention deriving solely from the courts' equitable pow-
ers.7 1  That emphasis on equity was more fully developed in
tors include whether state law will provide the rule of decision-in other words, Colorado
River "abstention" should generally not apply in federal question cases-and whether the
state-court proceeding will adequately protect the non-movant party. See Moses H. Cone,
460 U.S. at 23, 26.
It is notable that the factors mentioned in Colorado River were not so much "factors" as a
collection of circumstances in which the Court had previously acknowledged the need for
some flexibility in declining jurisdiction. The first "factor," for example, was a reference to
the courts' equitable discretion to stay cases seeking declaratory judgments. See Brillhart v.
Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491 (1942); see also Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S.
277 (1995) (discussing Brillhart as establishing a more flexible standard than Colorado Riv-
er for use in Declaratory Judgment Act cases). The third "factor" listed in Colorado River
was a reference to the doctrine of forum non conveniens as articulated by the Court in Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), which is discussed further below in Subsection
IH.A.3. And the fourth factor reflects the narrow Princess Lida doctrine, see Princess Lida of
Thum and Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939), noted below in Subsection ffl.B.2.
65 See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, A Branch Too Far: Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 75
Geo. L.J. 99, 156 (1986) ("[A]bstention for reasons of wise judicial administration .. . is
properly construed only as an unprincipled judicial self-help remedy. It is judicial activism
of the most blatant kind: a cynical disregard for clearly expressed congressional intent that
the federal courts exercise jurisdiction under circumstances that are statutorily defmed.").
66 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
67 Id. at 43-44.
68 See Fred 0. Smith, Jr., Abstention in the Time of Ferguson, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 2283,
2295 (2018) ("Over the course of the next decade, Younger abstention expand-
ed. . precipitously. . . .").
6 See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592
(1975).
70 See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
71 NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 359.
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 105:63
Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co.,72 in which a unanimous Court
located the authority to abstain in the courts' equitable powers, a source
of discretion that fits more easily with Congress's authority to set the ju-
risdiction of the federal courts. Thus the power to dismiss cases based
on abstention is limited to cases seeking equitable or other discretionary
forms of relief.74 After Quackenbush, cases seeking nondiscretionary le-
gal remedies may only be stayed.
Most recently, in Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs,76 the Court
made clear its disinterest in further expanding abstention principles. "In
the main," Justice Ginsburg wrote for another unanimous Court, "feder-
al courts are obliged to decide cases within the scope of federal jurisdic-
tion." 77 Thus "federal courts ordinarily should entertain and resolve on
the merits an action within the scope of a jurisdictional grant, and should
not 'refus[e] to decide a case in deference to the States.' 78 In particular,
the Sprint Court warned against broad grounds for abstention and lim-
ited Younger abstention to the three "exceptional circumstances" it had
previously identified.79 Recall also in this regard the Court's stated pref-
erence for certification of state law questions whenever possible.o Ab-
72 517 U.S. 706 (1996).
73 See id. at 717-18.
74 Id. at 731. While Quackenbush addressed the application of Burford abstention in par-
ticular, its holding was phrased more broadly in terms of "cases based on abstention princi-
ples." Id. On the questionable defensibility of this holding given the Court's prior abstention
cases, see Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev.
1891, 1898-1900 (2004).
" Justice Kennedy, in a concurrence, did raise the possibility that a suit for damages might
be dismissed "where a serious affront to the interests of federalism could be averted in no
other way." Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 733 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He was alone, howev-
er, in wishing to leave this door open. See id. at 731-32 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I would not
have joined today's opinion if I believed it left such discretionary dismissal available.").
The limits on abstention articulated in Quackenbush may not necessarily extend to Colo-
rado River deference to parallel litigation, however, as the Court was careful not to label
such deference as abstention and has separately acknowledged that a stay in such circum-
stances "is as much a refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction as a dismissal." Moses H. Cone
Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 14-15 & n.16, 28 (1983). Quackenbush
also excepted forum non conveniens from its curtailment of abstention, though not on ana-
lytically satisfying grounds. See Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 37, at
454-55.
76 571 U.S. 69 (2013).
1 Id. at 72.
7 Id. at 73 (quoting NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368).
7 Id. at 81-82.
80 See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
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stention, the Court has made clear, is not a blunt instrument to be in-
voked broadly, but a scalpel to be used rarely, if at all."
Other prudential doctrines: The Court's concern about jurisdictional
obligation extends beyond abstention to other discretionary doctrines of
judicial restraint. Most notably, the Court in Lexmark International, Inc.
v. Static Control Components, Inc.82 drew into question the continuing
viability of "prudential standing" as an exercise of judicial discretion. 8 3
The concept of prudential standing, Justice Scalia wrote for the majority,
"is in some tension with [the Court's] recent reaffirmation" in Sprint of
the federal courts' obligation to exercise their congressionally granted
jurisdiction.84 In particular, Lexmark clarified that challenges to standing
based on a statute's "zone of interests" are not resolved as a matter of
judicial discretion, but are instead matters of statutory interpretation.
And in a footnote, Justice Scalia suggested that the Court has recharac-
terized the bar on generalized grievances-a prudential limit on stand-
ing-as another aspect of Article III's injury-in-fact requirement. 86
several standing decisions since Lexmark, the Court has avoided refer-
ence to prudential requirements even while alluding to generalized
grievances 87 and the zone-of-interests test,8 8 suggesting that the re-
8 Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Why Abstention Is Not Illegitimate: An Essay on the Distinc-
tion Between "Legitimate" and "Illegitimate" Statutory Interpretation and Judicial Lawmak-
ing, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 847, 850, 869 (2013) ("Since the 1980s, the Supreme Court has not
only arrested the expansion of abstention doctrine, but also pruned some of its branches.").
82 572 U.S. 118 (2014).
83 See Ernest A. Young, Prudential Standing after Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 10 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol'y 149, 151-53 (2014)84 Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 126.
8 Id. at 127.
86 Id. at 127 n.3. In the same footnote, Justice Scalia also drew into question the proper
characterization of limits to third-party standing. See id. (conceding that "[t]he limitations on
third-party standing are harder to classify" and concluding that "consideration of that doc-
trine's proper place in the standing firmament can await another day"). But see Sessions v.
Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689 (2017) (relying on third-party standing without ref-
erencing Lexmark).
8 See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929-31 (2018) (characterizing as a question of
"injury in fact" what might have been characterized as a generalized grievance); Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (summarizing only the constitutional limits on
Article III standing); id. at 1555 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the particularity re-
quirement-a component of injury-in-fact-"bars complaints raising generalized grievanc-
es").
88 See Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1302-03 (2017) (noting
that Lexmark identified the label of "prudential standing" as "misleading, for the require-
ment at issue [the zone-of-interests test] is in reality tied to a particular statute" and is thus a
question of statutory interpretation).
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 105:63
categorizing of prudential standing requirements may not be limited to
Lexmark's Lanham Act context (or to Scalia's tenure on the Court8 9 ).
Meanwhile, in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,90 Justice Thomas
cast doubt on the continuing viability of prudential ripeness require-
ments, echoing Lexmark's concern that such prudential restraint is in
tension with the federal courts' obligation to exercise the jurisdiction
granted by Congress. 91 And in Zivotofsky v. Clinton ("Zivotofsky 1"),92
the majority emphasized that the political question doctrine is but a
"narrow exception" to the rule that "the Judiciary has a responsibility to
decide cases properly before it," 93 and it omitted the doctrine's more
prudential factors.94 This is not to suggest that the Court is ready to em-
brace an absolute rule of jurisdictional obligation. 9 5 But the Court has
been interested lately in eliminating or narrowing the exceptions to the
rule.96
89 See Pfander, supra note 32, at 90-91, 96-97, 105-06 (attributing these shifts to Scalia's
jurisprudence).
90 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014).
91 Id. at 2347 (quoting Lexmark in remarking on this tension but concluding that "we need
not resolve the continuing vitality of the prudential ripeness doctrine in this case").
92 566 U.S. 189 (2012).
9 Id. at 194-95 (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)).
94 See id. at 195 (citing only two factors: "a textually demonstrable constitutional com-
mitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it" (quoting Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,
228 (1993))). In contrast, Justices Sotomayor and Breyer urged the continuing relevance of
prudential considerations in allowing judges to avoid politically charged foreign relations
cases. Id. at 202-06 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id.
at 212-13 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Nolette, supra note 20, at 243 & n.127 (gathering
commentators who have understood Zivotofsky I as a repudiation of the political question
doctrine's prudential factors).
" See, e.g., Young, supra note 83, at 163. In particular, for a critique of Scalia's standing
decisions as an expression of judicial functionalism that belies an absolute commitment to
separation-of-powers principles, see Pfander, supra note 32, at 106.
96 An exception may be the Court's reaffirmation of the "comity doctrine" that "restrains
federal courts from entertaining claims for relief that risk disrupting state tax administra-
tion." See Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413, 417 (2010). The state-tax comity
doctrine is a "prudential doctrine" much akin to abstention, and like abstention, it supports
cooperative federalism. But it operates in conjunction with a congressional directive (the
Tax Injunction Act), which indicates congressional support for the comity doctrine and
which-as a practical matter-limits the range of equitable relief a federal court is able to
grant. See id. at 421-24.
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B. Is Transnational Litigation Different?
This Section argues that transnational litigation is not so different as
to displace entirely the separation-of-powers concerns underlying the
presumption of jurisdictional obligation. Nor is open-ended abstention
in transnational cases necessary to further the Court's recent efforts to
curtail excessive cross-border litigation. Broad judicial discretion to de-
cline congressionally granted jurisdiction should also be suspect in the
context of transnational litigation.
1. The Limited Exceptionalism of Transnational Litigation
Along some dimensions, transnational litigation does differ from
purely domestic litigation. It might implicate foreign relations doctrines,
like foreign sovereign immunity or the act of state doctrine. Occasional-
ly, high-profile cases may ruffle the feathers of foreign allies.97 And
even routine procedural decisions may require judicial assistance from
other countries, whether ad hoc or via formal treaty arrangements. 98
Transnational cases thus trigger the standard intuition that foreign affairs
are within the special competence of the executive branch.99 And to the
extent that the executive branch does have a particular interest in trans-
national litigation, perhaps the presumption of jurisdictional obliga-
tion-that the federal courts should defer to Congress's jurisdictional
grants-should apply less stringently in this context.
Several considerations, however, cut in the other direction. First, it is
the rare transnational case that garners the attention of a foreign sover-
eign today. Given the global economy, most transnational litigation in-
volves run-of-the-mill disputes, often sounding in traditional fields of
(domestic) state power like contracts or torts-not high-stakes political
fights that implicate the core diplomatic prerogatives of the federal gov-
ernment. 00
97 See generally Kristen E. Eichensehr, Foreign Sovereigns as Friends of the Court, 102
Va. L. Rev. 289 (2016) (discussing foreign sovereigns' interventions in U.S. litigation as
amici).
98 See generally Gardner, Parochial Procedure, supra note 37, at 968-83, 994-1003 (dis-
cussing the federal courts' application of the Hague Evidence Convention and the Hague
Service Convention).
" See Bradley, supra note 25, at 4-6 (summarizing traditional functional arguments for
executive control of foreign relations).
`o See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 Va. L. Rev.
649, 651 (2000) (noting that "a bright-line distinction between 'foreign' and 'domes-
tic' . . . appears increasingly less tenable in this age of globalization"); Jack L. Goldsmith,
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Second, the common shorthand that the Executive has special compe-
tence in foreign relations is not wrong, but it is only a partial truth.
Within our constitutional structure, all components of the government-
including Congress, the courts, and the states-have some role to play in
matters that touch on foreign interests, albeit to differing degrees.ot For
one thing, U.S. states have their own interests in transnational litigation
that the Constitution does not entirely displace. 10 2 As Professors Seth
Davis and Chris Whytock have recently emphasized in the context of
human rights litigation, "[p]roviding law for the redress of wrongs is not
a matter of foreign relations committed to the federal government simp-
ly because those wrongs involve human rights violations." 0 3 At the very
least, states have interests in providing remedies for common law and
statutory injuries committed within their territory or against their citi-
zens, regulating their citizens (including corporate citizens), and main-
taining judicial forums for pursuing all of the above. Recognizing the
validity and breadth of such state interests does not mean that those in-
Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1617, 1622 (1997) ("The
problem is that the traditional conception of foreign affairs has changed to include matters
formerly viewed as purely domestic issues .... But as this distinction between foreign and
domestic affairs has waned, the criterion of 'foreign relations' has lost whatever reliability it
might have had as an indicator of matters that should presumptively be governed by federal
law."). See generally Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Re-
lations Law, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1897 (2015) (arguing that the Supreme Court has moved
away from foreign affairs exceptionalism in recent Terms).
101 See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 100, at 1622-23, 1665 (arguing against "wooden no-
tions of foreign affairs exclusivity" and in favor of recognizing state interests in transnation-
al cases); see also Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the
Roberts Court, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 380, 389 (2015) ("If state criminal procedure and
random lovers' quarrels can be plausibly described as having foreign affairs implications,
and foreign-based banks, oil companies, terrorists, and insurgents can be subjected to the full
force of federal regulation, the mere mention of the term 'foreign affairs' or 'national securi-
ty' cannot be enough to release the government or its policies from judicial scrutiny." (cita-
tions omitted)).
102 Cf. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419 n. 11 (2003) (suggesting that states
may legislate in areas of "traditional state responsibility" in a manner that "affects foreign
relations" as long as it does not conflict with federal law); Goldsmith, supra note 100, at
1677 (noting that the broad label of "[fjoreign relations includes many matters traditionally
regulated by states," such that states may have a "legitimate interest in the regulation of for-
eign relations" alongside the federal government); Ingrid Wuerth, The Future of the Federal
Common Law of Foreign Relations, 106 Geo. L.J. 1825, 1830-32 (2018) (arguing that
dormant foreign affairs preemption may be in decline).
103 Davis & Whytock, supra note 35, at 404.
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terests-and the state's power to enforce them--are unlimited.' 04 But
under our federalist system, they should not be lightly ignored.
And even when the federal interest in a cross-border case is greater
than that of the states, that federal interest does not reside entirely within
the executive branch. Congress has a role in managing foreign relations
as well,os and the proper institutional function of the courts might be to
carry out those congressional directives instead. 106 Consider in this re-
gard the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which directs the courts to
resolve certain questions implicating foreign interests in the first in-
stance.10 7 Or consider other statutes with more substantive aims, from
Title VIP 08 to antitrust laws' 09 to sex trafficking prohibitions,1 0 where
Congress has explicitly indicated its intent that the statute's proscrip-
tions extend, at least to some extent, beyond U.S. borders. The message
from Congress is that the federal courts should be engaged in some
transnational litigation.
The current practice of broad abstention in transnational cases is in
tension with the role of Congress and the states in setting the parameters
of court access. Like domestic abstention, abstention in transnational
cases treads on Congress's power to define the scope of the federal
104 One significant limit, of course, is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Another is foreign affairs preemption. See, e.g., Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 413-20.
105 See, e.g., Kristen E. Eichensehr, Courts, Congress, and the Conduct of Foreign Rela-
tions, 85 U. Chi. L. Rev. 609, 612-14, 629-39 (2018) (exploring Congress's power to con-
duct foreign relations); Ryan M. Scoville, Legislative Diplomacy, 112 Mich. L. Rev. 331,
336-51, 380-93 (2013) (documenting Congress's ability and willingness to engage in for-
eign diplomacy); Recent Signing Statements, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 674, 678 (2017) (using the
Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 115-44, 131 Stat. 886 (2017), to illustrate how "Congress too en-
joys special gifts as a maker of foreign policy" and arguing that "the Court should adopt a
balanced functionalism that pays respect to Congress's talents"); cf. Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control over International Law, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1201,
1257-70 (2018) (describing-and encouraging-interbranch checks on presidential control
over international law).
106 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1994); see also Bradley, supra note 100, at 713-16 (iden-
tifying the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the act of state doctrine, and dormant foreign
affairs preemption doctrine as examples of questions where Chevron deference should not
apply because Congress has not delegated lawmaking authority to the Executive).
107 See id. at 713-14.
108 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
1'0 See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat.
1246 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a).
110 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (2012).
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courts' jurisdiction."' But more than domestic abstention, it also risks
undermining Congress's regulatory goals. In domestic cases, after all,
federal courts abstain in favor of other U.S. courts, which are more like-
ly than foreign courts to resolve disputes in a manner that aligns with (or
even applies) U.S. federal law. 112
Further, while doctrines of domestic abstention are justified as pro-
moting "our federalism,"" 3 transnational abstention may instead dis-
place state laws or state decisions regarding court access. Especially
when paired with other federal judge-made law (consider, for example,
removal based on dormant foreign affairs preemption of otherwise non-
removable diversity cases'14), "international comity abstention" may en-
able federal judges to override state remedies and state forums.115 To the
extent some states are opening courthouse doors to transnational cas-
es,1"6 then, the federal courts may be poised to close them-not based on
congressional directives or constitutional demands, but on the intuition
of federal judges that some cases simply do not belong in U.S. courts.
2. Avoiding Excessive Transnational Litigation
Alternatively, one might be skeptical that the presumption of jurisdic-
tional obligation applies as strongly to transnational cases given its ten-
sion with another trend at the Supreme Court: its growing wariness of
1 See Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Fric-
tion on the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 1147, 1152-53 (2006) (arguing
that forum non conveniens, which is a form of transnational abstention, usurps congressional
power to define the federal courts' jurisdiction); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers
of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 735, 855 (2001) (arguing
that the "power to dismiss suits" on the basis that they are "better brought in state or foreign
courts" belongs to Congress, not federal judges).
112 Cf Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Conflict and Jurisdictional Equilibration: Paths
to a Via Media?, 26 Hous. J. Int'l L. 385, 399-400 (2004) (arguing that forum non conven-
iens should not be applied to statutory claims because doing so undermines domestic regula-
tory interests).
113 E.g., Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 28.
114 See Goldsmith, supra note 100, at 1623-24, 1631 (critiquing judge-made foreign rela-
tions law, including dormant foreign affairs preemption, as displacing legitimate efforts by
states to regulate transnational conduct).
115 Id. at 1696-97 (criticizing Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540 (5th
Cir. 1997), on this basis).
116 The willingness of state courts to entertain such cases is by no means universal. See,
e.g., Aranda v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 183 A.3d 1245, 1255 (Del. 2018) (allowing forum
non conveniens dismissal of a transnational suit against Delaware defendants even in the
absence of an available alternative forum).
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transnational litigation in U.S. courts.'17 In recent Terms, the Supreme
Court has, for example, curtailed the use of the Alien Tort Statute to liti-
gate foreign conduct,' 1 8 reinvigorated the presumption against extraterri-
toriality to circumscribe the geographic reach of U.S. laws," 9 reaffirmed
the use of forum non conveniens to dismiss transnational cases,' 20 and
limited the ability of U.S. courts to assert personal jurisdiction over for-
eign corporations in particular.' 2 '
Though notable, this trend does not-and should not--override the
Court's parallel emphasis on jurisdictional obligation. For one thing, the
Court has itself suggested that the principle applies to transnational liti-
gation by insisting on narrow applications of two abstention-like doc-
trines: the political question doctrine and the act of state doctrine. The
political question doctrine, the Court emphasized in Zivotofsky I, is but a
"narrow exception to [the] rule" that "the Judiciary has a responsibility
to decide cases properly before it, even those it 'would gladly avoid."' 122
And earlier, in WS. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics
Corp., International,12 3 the Court explained that the act of state doctrine
is not some "vague doctrine of abstention" that allows courts to decline
jurisdiction based on the risk of "embarrassment" to the executive
branch or foreign governments.1 24 "The short of the matter is this," Jus-
tice Scalia summed up for a unanimous bench: "Courts in the United
States have the power, and ordinarily the obligation, to decide cases and
controversies properly presented to them"125 when those cases
and controversies touch on foreign interests.
Nor do judges need a broad power to abstain in order to prevent ex-
cessive transnational litigation. To the extent the Court's circumscrip-
11 See generally Bookman, supra note 13 (documenting and critiquing this trend).
11s See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124-25 (2013); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724-
25 (2004).
119 See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016); Kiobel,
569 U.S. at 124-25; Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255, 265 (2010).
120 See Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007).
121 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 121-22 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919-20 (2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicas-
tro, 564 U.S. 873, 877-78 (2011) (plurality opinion).
122 Zivotofsky 1, 566 U.S. at 194-95 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,
404 (1821)).
123 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
124 Id. at 406, 408-09.
125 Id. at 409.
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tion of transnational litigation reflects a concern about the exorbitant ex-
ercise of jurisdictionl 26-that U.S. laws and courts are reaching too far
beyond U.S. borders-the Court's recent decisions have addressed many
of those exorbitant practices. With newly refined tools to determine the
geographic limits of statutes, reign in personal jurisdiction, and limit the
reach of the Alien Tort Statute in particular, federal judges have less
need for open-ended safety valves like forum non conveniens or interna-
tional comity abstention. 12 7
Comity-the idea that U.S. courts should recognize the interests of
foreign sovereigns in expectation that other nations will do the
samel 28-does not require a broad power to abstain in transnational cas-
es, either. As the Court has noted, comity indicates that there must be a
limit on the geographic scope of U.S. laws and litigation in order not to
alienate other countries, on whose good graces U.S. parties must often
depend in turn. 129 This facet of comity has motivated some of the Justic-
es-particularly Justices Breyer and Ginsburg-in their decisions limit-
ing transnational litigation in U.S. courts. 130 But comity is not a unitary
126 See generally Kevin M. Clermont & John R.B. Palmer, Exorbitant Jurisdiction, 58 Me.
L. Rev. 474, 474 (2006) (defining exorbitant jurisdiction as "those classes of jurisdiction,
although exercised validly under a country's rules, that nonetheless are unfair to the defend-
ant because of a lack of significant connection between the sovereign and either the parties
or the dispute").
127 See, e.g., Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 37, at 429-39.
128 See Socidt6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 555
(1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Comity is not just a vague
political concern favoring international cooperation when it is in our interest to do so. Rather
it is a principle under which judicial decisions reflect the systemic value of reciprocal toler-
ance and goodwill."); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) (defining comity as "the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judi-
cial acts of another nation"). For a recent, thorough exploration of the concept of comity on
which this Article builds, see Dodge, International Comity in American Law, supra note 13.
129 See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A., 542 U.S. 155, 164-65 (2004)
(emphasizing the need to help "the potentially conflicting laws of different nations work to-
gether in harmony-a harmony particularly needed in today's highly interdependent com-
mercial world"); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (noting that the
presumption against extraterritoriality "serves to protect against unintended clashes between
our laws and those of other nations that could result in international discord"); The Bremen
v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) ("We cannot have trade and commerce in
world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and
resolved in our courts.").
130 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 141 (2014) (noting the "risks to interna-
tional comity" that arise when U.S. allies "do not share the [same] uninhibited approach to
personal jurisdiction"); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 128-29 (2013)
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting the role of comity in "lead[ing] each nation
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doctrine that always calls for forbearance.131 Sometimes what comity
requires is not restraint, but the accommodation of foreign litigants, 132
foreign law,133 and foreign judgments. 134 If U.S. courts exclude too
to respect the sovereign rights of other nations by limiting the reach of its own laws and their
enforcement"); see also Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1405-06 (2018) (opin-
ion of Kennedy, J.) (stressing judicial restraint in the treatment of foreign corporations in
order to encourage similar treatment of U.S. corporations abroad).
131 Indeed, the historical roots of comity lie in the recognition of foreign interests in do-
mestic courts, not the forbearance of domestic courts out of deference to foreign interests.
See, e.g., Campbell McLachlan, Lis Pendens in International Litigation 32-34 (2009) (sug-
gesting the Dutch progenitors of comity were comfortable with "giving effect to foreign law
and foreign judgments," but not necessarily the "much stronger form of comity" of "ced[ing]
the power of adjudication to a foreign court").
132 On providing judicial fora for foreign plaintiffs, see, for example, Disconto Gesell-
schaft v. Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570, 578 (1908) ("Alien citizens, by the policy and practice of
the courts of this country, are ordinarily permitted to resort to the courts for the redress of
wrongs and the protection of their rights."); Gary B. Born & Peter B. Rutledge, International
Civil Litigation in United States Courts 366 (5th ed. 2011) ("It was long settled that neither
foreign citizens nor foreign residents were barred from access to U.S. courts, including in
actions arising abroad under foreign law."). Recently, in Jesner v. Arab Bank PLC, the Jus-
tices generally agreed that the Alien Tort Statute was designed to provide foreigners with a
judicial forum in order to avoid international retaliation, though they disagreed sharply about
whether and when providing such a forum could shift from preventing international friction
to creating it. Compare Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1406 ("The ATS was intended to promote har-
mony in international relations by ensuring foreign plaintiffs a remedy for international-law
violations .... But here, and in similar cases, the opposite is occurring."), and id. at 1410
(Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (similar), with id. at 1435 (So-
tomayor, J., dissenting) ("[H]olding corporations accountable for violating the human rights
of foreign citizens when those violations touch and concern the United States may well be
necessary to avoid the international tension with which the First Congress was con-
cerned ... . Immunizing the corporation from suit under the ATS merely because it is a cor-
poration .. . might cause serious diplomatic friction.").
On providing judicial fora for foreign sovereigns in particular, see Banco Nacional de Cu-
ba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1964) ("Under principles of comity governing this
country's relations with other nations, sovereign states are allowed to sue in the courts of the
United States."), and Hannah L. Buxbaum, Foreign Governments as Plaintiffs in U.S. Courts
and the Case Against "Judicial Imperialism," 73 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 653, 660 (2016)
(summarizing Supreme Court doctrine on this point). On the normalcy of foreign states ap-
pearing as plaintiffs before U.S. courts, see generally id. (highlighting the regularity of for-
eign sovereigns appearing as plaintiffs in U.S. courts); Zachary D. Clopton, Diagonal Public
Enforcement, 70 Stan. L. Rev. 1077 (2018) (discussing foreign governments' use of U.S.
courts to invoke U.S. federal law); see also Eichensehr, supra note 97 (describing interven-
tions of foreign states as amici in U.S. Supreme Court cases).
133 See Dodge, International Comity in American Law, supra note 13, at 2100-02; see also
Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1873 (2018) ("In
the spirit of 'international comity,' a federal court should carefully consider a foreign state's
views about the meaning of its own laws." (citation omitted)).
134 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
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many transnational cases, then, they may end up undermining a different
set of comity commitments.1 3 5 As Justice Ginsburg recently explained,
an overly strict presumption against extraterritoriality "might spark, ra-
ther than quell, international strife," for "[m]aking such litigation avail-
able to domestic but not foreign plaintiffs is hardly solicitous of interna-
tional comity or respectful of foreign interests."1 36 In short, comity and
the presumption of jurisdictional obligation may at times point in the
same direction: towards exercising the jurisdiction set by Congress and
expected by allies.
Finally, to the extent this trend to limit transnational litigation has in-
stead been motivated by skepticism of foreign plaintiffs or of litigation
more generally, the principle of jurisdictional obligation serves as a re-
minder of the constitutional values at stake when jurists allow their
normative commitments to displace congressional directives. As a gen-
eral matter, the federal courts-in transnational and domestic cases
alike-should presumptively hear those cases that fall within their
grants of jurisdiction, even if individual judges would have drawn those
lines differently.
C. Striking the Balance
Recognizing the presumption of jurisdictional obligation at work in
transnational litigation, however, does not require an absolute bar on all
abstention. Similar to the Court's treatment of abstention in domestic
cases, the better approach is to emphasize the presumption in favor of
exercising jurisdiction and to enumerate limited, narrow, and specified
exceptions to that rule.1 37 This Section offers both a theoretical and a
pragmatic defense for that approach.
As a theoretical matter, if the presumption of jurisdictional obligation
is rooted in the separation of powers, a denial of all judicial discretion to
decline jurisdiction can be as dangerous as an embrace of full discretion.
135 See, e.g., Bookman, supra note 13, at 1120-21; Buxbaum, supra note 132, at 656-58;
Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 37, at 392-95.
136 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2115 (2016) (Ginsburg, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part and from the judgement); see also id. ("[A] foreign na-
tion is generally entitled to prosecute any civil claim in the courts of the United States upon
the same basis as a domestic corporation or individual might do. To deny him this privilege
would manifest a want of comity and friendly feeling." (alteration in original) (quoting Pfiz-
er Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 318-19 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted).
137 Cf. Sprint, 571 U.S. at 76-77 (adopting this approach for Younger abstention). For fur-
ther discussion of this parallel, see note 31 above.
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Even if justified as an act of judicial humility, disclaiming discretion
may serve instead to displace congressional preferences by reifying
boundaries that are themselves identified by judges. With abstention, for
example, it may be impossible for Congress to draw clear jurisdictional
lines ex ante.1 38 Insisting on strict, formalistic adherence to jurisdictional
grants may perversely hamper Congress by forcing Congress to err on
the side of underinclusive jurisdictional grants.
This is not a new insight. Professor Fred Smith, Jr. has recently ex-
plained how recasting prudential doctrines as constitutional limits in-
creases judicial power at the expense of Congress: While Congress
could override prudential limits on standing, for example, it cannot over-
ride a constitutionalized prohibition on generalized grievances.1 39 Simi-
larly, Professor Harlan Cohen sees power rather than restraint in the
Court's narrowing of the political question doctrine in Zivotofsky L By
limiting judicial discretion to decline jurisdiction in Zivotofsky I, the
Court in Zivotofsky v. Kerry ("Zivotofsky Il")140 was able to shut down
an active debate about the division and exercise of foreign affairs power
between the political branches in a way that reduces rather than furthers
democratic dialogue. 141 Professor James Pfander has argued that Justice
Scalia's standing decisions (including Lexmark) swapped prudential
doctrines that had self-consciously left room for Congress to intervene
for Scalia's own judicial "conception of the proper limits on government
action," which then serves "as the basis for invalidating choices made by
the political representatives of the people." 14 2 Both Dean John Manning
and Professor Alison LaCroix have critiqued the Roberts Court's invo-
cations of the Necessary and Proper Clause as giving the Court, "rather
than Congress, the final say about how to implement federal power,"1 43
thereby "narrow[ing] the permissible scope of congressional regulatory
power.""'4
138 See, e.g., Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction's Noble Lie, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 971, 1006-07
(2009); Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1, 3-5
(2011); Meltzer, supra note 74, at 1893; Shapiro, supra note 18, at 574.
139 Smith, supra note 16, at 852-53.
140 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
141 See Cohen, supra note 33; see also Cohen, supra note 101, at 388-89 (explaining that
the Roberts Court's turn to formalism in foreign affairs "is not a product of judicial humility
or restraint; this formalism is about a Court retaking control").
142 Pfander, supra note 32, at 89, 106.
143 Manning, supra note 20, at 5.




Strict formalism raises pragmatic concerns as well, particularly when
it comes to abstention. Rules that place questions of jurisdiction and jus-
ticiability into straitjackets will only encourage nontransparent moves to
create judicial flexibility elsewhere. This hydraulic pressure can lead to
the distortion of other doctrines or the use of unreviewable case man-
agement tools to manage these cases away. 145 To the extent Congress
cannot draw perfect jurisdictional lines in advance, judges will need
some breathing room around the edges; denying all discretion will only
serve to make the inevitable exercise of such discretion less transparent.
D. Designing Doctrines
The challenge, then, is to provide space for exceptions without allow-
ing those exceptions to overtake the default rule. This is where I part
ways with Shapiro's defense of jurisdictional discretion. Shapiro count-
ed on reasoned elaboration by judges to identify manageable criteria and
to narrow-rather than expand-the bounds of discretion over time. 146
The problem is that broad, unstructured doctrines of judicial restraint,
like the current formulation of "international comity abstention," do not
promote the sort of reasoned elaboration on which Professor Shapiro
pinned his hopes. 147
I have explained elsewhere how open-ended standards for evaluating
complex systemic values like international comity are prone to distor-
tion over time. 148 For present purposes, it suffices to note that designing
judicially manageable frameworks, at least in the context of procedure,
involves three interrelated considerations. First and most importantly,
145 For example, as Professor Harlan Cohen has cogently warned, one risk of strict formal-
ism "is that cases that cannot easily be resolved with formal tools will not be resolved at all.
A renewed commitment to formalism may also mean stricter pleading or standing standards
or a sort of backdoor functionalism [on the part of the Supreme Court] through the denial of
certiorari in thorny foreign affairs cases." Cohen, supra note 101, at 391 (citation omitted).
146 See Shapiro, supra note 18, at 574-75, 578-79; see also Meltzer, supra note 74, at 1919
(summarizing this aspect of Shapiro's argument).
147 Cf. Meltzer, supra note 74, at 1910-13 ("I think Shapiro may at times be just a little too
sanguine that judicial discretion will be exercised in a fashion that will be conducive to pre-
dictable, stable, and relatively expeditious and efficient decisionmaking. . . .").
148 See Gardner, Parochial Procedure, supra note 37, at 958-67; Gardner, Retiring Forum
Non Conveniens, supra note 37, at 418-23; see also Ronald A. Heiner, The Origin of Pre-
dictable Behavior, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 560, 563, 565 (1983) (explaining how when "an
agent's perceptual abilities become less reliable or the environment becomes more com-
plex," "allowing greater flexibility to react to more information or administer a more com-
plex repertoire of actions will not necessarily enhance an agent's performance").
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the factors must align with the question being asked. Analytical frame-
works that require consideration of distinct factors can help judges
check their intuition and thereby improve their decision making, 149 but
only if the factors are relevant. That may sound obvious, but particularly
in complex or unfamiliar fields like transnational litigation, judges have
transplanted rubrics from not-quite-analogous doctrines. For example,
sometimes judges draw on domestic analogues that do not adequately
take into account international comity considerations.' Other times,
they may draw on comity doctrines that are designed to answer funda-
mentally different questions.1 s' This mismatch leaves judges trying to
evaluate factors that do not fit the problem before them, resulting in
more of a Rorschach test than an analytical guide. A primary goal of
Part II is to weed out such tangential factors from discussions of absten-
tion in transnational cases.
Second, the factors must be judicially ascertainable, meaning they
must be fairly specific and must turn on information judges can reliably
obtain. 5 2 And third, the number of factors and the inquiry they demand
must be limited for the sake of efficiency, particularly for procedural or
threshold questions that often need to be resolved without extensive fac-
tual development.1 5 3 Factors that are too numerous or too hard to evalu-
ate encourage judges to fall back on generalized or conclusory state-
149 See Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 Cornell
L. Rev. 1, 3, 33 (2007) (describing and advocating for such an "intuitive-override" approach
to judging).
1s0 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Con-
vention and Progress in National Law, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 203, 208-09, 212-13 (2001) (cri-
tiquing cross-fertilization between domestic and transnational procedure that prioritizes na-
tional uniformity over transnational cooperation); Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens,
supra note 37, at 419 (critiquing the transplantation of the domestic test for forum non con-
veniens to the context of transnational litigation without any modification); Austen L. Par-
rish, Duplicative Foreign Litigation, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 237, 242 (2010).
151I describe a couple examples of such conflation, and the problems it causes, in Part II.
152 Cf. Zachary D. Clopton, Judging Foreign States, 94 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1, 31 (2016) (in
the context of doctrinal design, noting that "U.S. courts are equipped to handle disputes" that
are "legal, retrospective, bilateral, and constrained").
153 To analogize again to the Court's critique of nonparty preclusion, "a diffuse balancing
approach .. . would likely create more headaches than it relieves. Most obviously, it could
significantly complicate the task of district courts faced in the first instance with preclusion
questions. An all-things-considered balancing approach might spark wide-ranging, time-
consuming, and expensive discovery tracking factors potentially relevant under seven- or
five-prong tests." Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 901 (2008); see also Robert G. Bone,
Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 1961, 2015-16(2007) (discouraging the use of complex multifactor tests for procedural decisions).
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ments; the factors will not be independently evaluated in new cases and
thus will become rote and marginalized over time.' 5 4 The tendency to
ossify or gloss over hard or misaligned factors is further increased by the
phenomenon of "satisficing," in particular the use of stopping rules: de-
cision makers, consciously or otherwise, may settle for "good enough"
outcomes based on the first few factors they consider in lieu of pursuing
an optimally correct outcome that may depend on a much more complex
inquiry."ss Thus tests that call for weighing ten or a dozen factors should
be viewed skeptically, as decision makers may not be willing or even
able to independently assess all of them.156
Take, for example, one of the Eleventh Circuit's tests for comity ab-
stention: courts should weigh "(1) international comity; (2) fairness to
litigants; and (3) efficient use of scarce judicial resources." 1 57 That
standard is so vague as to be practically meaningless, so the Eleventh
Circuit has added additional subfactors for each part of the standard.
Some of those subfactors were drawn from Colorado River,1 58 a domes-
tic doctrine that might not translate perfectly to the transnational con-
text. 159 Other factors were drawn from the test for recognizing foreign
judgments 160 -a test that is orthogonal to the question of abstention.1 61
154 On the challenges of evaluating factors relating to foreign sovereign interests or foreign
judicial systems, see Gardner, Parochial Procedure, supra note 37, at 965-67. For a specific
example of how these challenges can distort doctrinal inquiries, see Gardner, Retiring Forum
Non Conveniens, supra note 37, at 422-23 (describing the adequate and available alternative
forum inquiry for forum non conveniens).
1I See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark In-
fringement, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1581, 1601-04 (2006).
156 See id. at 1645-46 ("[M]ultifactor tests of ten or even eight factors appear to ask too
much of the judge's ability simultaneously to weigh competing concerns and may simply
result in the stampeding of less significant factors."); Bone, supra note 153, at 2016 ("[T]he
resulting process can easily turn into ad hoc weighing that lacks meaningful constraint and
jeopardizes principled consistency over the system as a whole.").
157 Belize Telecom, Ltd. v. Gov't of Belize, 528 F.3d 1298, 1305 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing
Turner Entm't v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1518 (11th Cir. 1994)).
158 See id. at 1308 (defining the factors of "fairness to litigants" and "efficient use of judi-
cial resources" as including, inter alia, the Colorado River factors of "the order in which the
suits were filed," "the more convenient forum," and "avoidance of piecemeal litigation"
(quoting Turner, 25 F.3d at 1521-22)).
159 See infra Subsection Ll.B. 1 (suggesting an approach to parallel transnational litigation
that differs from Colorado River).
16o See Belize Telecom, 528 F.3d at 1306 (defining the factor of "international comity," for
purposes of comity abstention, as concerning "(1) whether the judgment was rendered via
fraud; (2) whether the judgment was rendered by a competent court utilizing proceedings
consistent with civilized jurisprudence; and (3) whether the foreign judgment is prejudicial,
in the sense of violating American public policy" (quoting Turner, 25 F.3d at 1519)).
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The end result is a ten-part test in which several factors are irrelevant to
abstention and others are hard to ascertain, with no indication of their
relative weight or importance. That test is difficult to apply and is thus
unlikely to lead to consistent results.
The next Part identifies how the broad label of "international comity
abstention" has encouraged this sort of misalignment of factors in the
tests of several circuits, and it attempts to disentangle abstention from
other comity-inflected doctrines. Part III then turns to what better-
designed doctrines of transnational abstention might look like in prac-
tice: narrowly defined exceptions to the strong default of jurisdictional
obligation that turn on a few ascertainable factors.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH "INTERNATIONAL COMITY ABSTENTION"
The first step to correcting course on transnational abstention is to
clarify what it is not. At present, federal judges are describing and ana-
lyzing "international comity abstention" by drawing on other comity
doctrines not related to abstention. This conflation carries two risks.
First, it may undermine state and congressional interests that these other
comity doctrines are trying to protect. Second, it leads to confusion, as
the transplanted factors often do not map logically onto the question of
abstention. That muddling decreases the transparency of judicial reason-
ing and may also increase error rates.1 62
The root of this confusion lies in the very label of "international
comity abstention."l 63 Comity is not a single doctrine, but a principle
that inflects a variety of doctrines. Different comity-based doctrines re-
quire different analyses; they involve different starting presumptions and
may point in different directions. The labeling of "comity abstention,"
however, encourages judges (and their clerks) to draw broadly from pri-
or discussions of comity, whether or not those discussions addressed ab-
stention principles specifically. After distinguishing the different types
of comity-based doctrines, this Part explains how questions of absten-
161 For further discussion of this distinction, see Section II.B below.
162 See Ramsey, supra note 13, at 951 (concluding that such undifferentiated use of the
term "comity" "confuses matters that should be straightforward," "finesses and submerges
important issues that should merit serious discussion," and leads to "unpredictability that
generally characterizes and unsettles the law of international relationships").
163 Cf. id. at 895-96 (arguing that imprecise invocations of the broad term "comity" invites
"intuitive judgment" that "leads to an abandonment of analytic evaluation").
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tion have become entangled with questions regarding the recognition of
foreign judgments and the construction of statutes.
A. Comity Is Not a Doctrine
Comity doctrines vary by valence and by the type of interests they are
meant to protect. In circumscribing transnational litigation,1" the Su-
preme Court has recently been invoking comity as a tool of forbearance
that helps the courts avoid stepping on the toes of foreign sovereigns.
But such restraint is only one side of comity. Comity may at times re-
quire action by the host state, whether in terms of recognizing foreign
judgments, applying foreign law, or providing a judicial forum for for-
eigners and foreign states. 16 5 As Professor William Dodge has ex-
plained, we should thus distinguish between (what I will call) "negative"
comity and "positive" comity doctrines.1 66
Dodge further divides comity doctrines based on the different types of
foreign interests they aim to accommodate. 167 Some comity doctrines,
such as the presumption against extraterritoriality, recognize foreign
sovereigns' prerogatives to regulate conduct ("prescriptive comity").
Others, such as forum non conveniens, recognize foreign sovereigns'
prerogatives to adjudicate conduct ("adjudicative comity"). And still
others, such as foreign sovereign immunity, recognize the prerogatives
of foreign sovereigns before U.S. courts ("sovereign party comity").
Combining these two dimensions produces the following matrix.
164 See supra Section I.B.2.
165 See supra notes 132-134.
166 The description of comity here is drawn directly from Dodge's account, although I
have modified some of his terminology. See Dodge, International Comity in American Law,
supra note 13, at 2078-79 (dividing comity doctrines into those recognizing a "principle of
recognition" versus those recognizing a "principle of restraint"). For additional efforts to
disaggregate "comity," see Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 Harv. Int'l L.J. I
(1991); Ramsey, supra note 13.
167 Dodge, International Comity in American Law, supra note 13, at 2078.
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Table 1: Disaggregating Comityl68
Negative Comity Positive Comity
Prescriptive Interpreting legislation so as Applying or recognizing the
Comity not to intrude on interests of law ofanother state
other states a Choice of law (e.g., apply-
* Presumption against extra- ing foreign law)






Adjudicative Declining jurisdiction in def- Supporting the work offoreign
Comity erence to the adjudicative in- courts or allowing access to
terests of another country U.S. courts
* Forum non conveniens * Recognition and enforce-
* "International comity ab- ment of foreign judgments
stention" * Foreign plaintiff access to
* Prudential exhaustion U.S. courts
* Limits on personal jurisdic- * Judicial assistance (e.g., dis-
tion covery under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782)
Sovereign Declining to assert power over Allowingforeign sovereigns to
Party Comity foreign sovereigns leverage power of the host state
* Foreign state immunity * Ability of foreign sover-
* Foreign official immunity eigns to bring suit in U.S.
Combining these different valences and purposes of comity can con-
fuse judicial analysis and potentially lead to erroneous outcomes. Put
simply, it is important to stay inside the box-and even within the same
box, factors from one doctrine will not necessarily bear on another.`9
1' This table is derived from the one compiled by Dodge, see id. at 2079 tbl. 1, though I
have omitted a few comity doctrines not discussed in this Article.
'19 See N. Jansen Calamita, Rethinking Comity: Towards a Coherent Treatment of Interna-
tional Parallel Proceedings, 27 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 601, 674 (2006) ("[W]hen the issue is
the application of adjudicatory comity, one size does not fit all. The presumptions that are
appropriate in one class of cases involving the application of adjudicatory comity are not
necessarily appropriate in another.").
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B. Distinguishing Positive and Negative Comity: The Recognition of
Foreign Judgments
The Eleventh Circuit has popularized a test for "international comity
abstention" that incorporates factors taken from the recognition of for-
eign judgments.1 70 This is a mistake, as these two doctrines ask very dif-
ferent questions. The recognition of a foreign judgment is an act of posi-
tive comity, while abstaining from deciding a case is an act of negative
comity. The former looks backward, at a judgment already issued, while
the latter looks forward, by making space for ongoing or future foreign
court proceedings.1 71 Indeed, the factors relevant to recognizing foreign
judgments are often orthogonal to the reasons why a judge might abstain
in a transnational case. Consider factors like "whether the judgment was
rendered via fraud" or "whether the foreign judgment is . . . repugnant to
fundamental principles of what is decent and just"l 72 ; how does a judge
apply those factors to decide whether to abstain in a case where there
has been no prior foreign judgment? This mismatch leads to muddled
analysis, which increases the risk that courts will abstain from cases they
should perhaps hear. And because the recognition of foreign judgments
is typically a matter of state law,1 73 the conflation of judgment recogni-
tion with a federal doctrine of abstention can sideline state law as well.
The U.S. approach to recognizing foreign judgments dates back to the
Supreme Court's 1895 decision in Hilton v. Guyot.1 74 In the Hilton tradi-
tion, now embodied in two uniform acts adopted by most U.S. states,
170 The recognition and the enforcement of a foreign judgment are two slightly different
matters. Recognition precedes enforcement; it also applies more broadly, encompassing mat-
ters of res judicata and issue preclusion. I will refer here primarily to the "recognition of for-
eign judgments" as the broader of the two concepts.
171 The Eleventh Circuit has recognized this distinction, explaining that "[t]he doctrine of
international comity can be applied retrospectively or prospectively," Ungaro-Benages v.
Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004), yet it still treats the doctrine on
the whole as "an abstention doctrine," id. at 1237.
172 Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 608 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Belize Telecom,
Ltd. v. Gov't of Belize, 528 F.3d 1298, 1306 (1th Cir. 2008)).
173 The only exception to this is the SPEECH Act, a federal law that governs the enforce-
ment of foreign libel judgments. See generally John F. Coyle, The SPEECH Act and the En-
forcement of Foreign Libel Judgments in the United States, 18 Y.B. Priv. Int'l L. 245 (2017)
(analyzing the SPEECH Act and the cases that have interpreted and applied it since its in-
ception).
174 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
171 See Unif Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act [UFCMJRA] § 4 (Unif.
Law Comm'n 2005); Unif. Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act §§ 3-4 (Unif. Law
Comm'n 1962); see also Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, Unif. Law
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U.S. courts apply a strong presumption in favor of recognizing foreign
judgments.1 76 That presumption can be overcome by a limited number of
exceptions, which are framed as high bars: for example, U.S. courts
generally refuse to recognize foreign judgments if the foreign court
lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant or jurisdiction over the
subject matter, or if the foreign judicial system is fundamentally un-
fair. 7 7 Given the narrowness of these exceptions, U.S. courts are known
to be particularly receptive to foreign judgments, perhaps more so than
the courts of any other country.178
These judgment recognition factors have seeped into the judge-made
test for international comity abstention through two routes. One is Hil-
ton itself, which also happens to provide one of the Court's strongest
pronouncements on the meaning and importance of international comity;
judges, it seems, have not always distinguished between Hilton's gen-
eral pronouncements on comity and its specific analysis of foreign
judgment enforcement. The other route has been through some early, in-
fluential appellate cases that involved both abstention and the recogni-
tion of foreign judgments. While those early cases did not themselves
conflate the two inquiries, later opinions that drew on those cases folded
the inquiries together. The result is a mismatched framework that can
encourage (or excuse) the exercise of bare judicial intuition. That evolu-
tionary story can be told in four cases.
The story begins with Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. Granger,179 a
1987 Seventh Circuit case regarding a cross-border employment dispute.
The employee, as the defendant in the U.S. case, moved to dismiss the
employer's complaint based on proceedings in the Belgian courts.180
Comm'n,https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey-a
e280c30-094a-4d8f-b722-8dcd614a8f3e [https://perma.cc/53FD-DWBU] (last visited Feb.
4, 2019) (listing states that have adopted the 2005 Act); The Uniform Foreign-Country Mon-
ey Judgments Recognition Act: A Summary, Unif. Law Comm'n, https://my.uniformlaws.or
g/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=e34db215-4834-
ad24-7blb-52dlf9c730c6 [https://perma.cc/X2NC-K6DJ] (last visited Feb. 4, 2019) (stating
that thirty-two states enacted the 1962 Act).
176 See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202-03; Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 481
(Am. Law Inst. 2018); UFCMJRA § 4(a).
1' UFCMJRA § 4(b); Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law § 483 (Am. Law
Inst. 2018).
178 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 89, 93 (1999).
"9 833 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1987).
180 Id. at 683.
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Those Belgian proceedings were much further advanced, and once the
Belgian court issued its judgment in the employee's favor, the employee
counterclaimed in the U.S. case to enforce the Belgian judgment here.'
The Seventh Circuit analyzed distinctly the two questions of parallel
proceedings and judgment enforcement, using two different tests. First,
it applied Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States
to affirm the district court's decision to stay the U.S. case in favor of the
Belgian proceedings. 182 Second, the court applied Illinois law to evalu-
ate whether the Belgian judgment was entitled to recognition and en-
forcementl83 (it wasl84 ). Though one can quibble with whether Colorado
River is the right standard for evaluating foreign parallel proceedings,' 85
Ingersoll is an analytically clear opinion.
The Eleventh Circuit drew on Ingersoll in its 1994 opinion in Turner
Entertainment v. Degeto Film GmbH,186 another case involving foreign
parallel proceedings (this time in Germany) in which the foreign court
had already rendered a judgment. In Turner, however, the defendant
sought only a stay of the U.S. proceedings and not separate recognition
of the German judgment.' The Eleventh Circuit in Turner, self-
consciously fashioning a doctrine of "international abstention" to re-
solve this question, identified three broadly relevant considerations:
"(1) . . . international comity; (2) fairness to litigants; and (3) efficient
use of scarce judicial resources."' 8 8 These highly generalized interests
do not provide a meaningful analytic structure, however, so the Turner
court had to fill them in. For "fairness to litigants" and "efficient use of
scarce judicial resources," the court drew additional factors from Colo-
rado River. But on the question of "international comity," the Turner
court drew on Hilton and Ingersoll to identify such factors as "whether
the judgment was rendered via fraud," "whether the judgment was ren-
dered by a competent court utilizing proceedings consistent with civi-
lized jurisprudence," "whether the foreign judgment ... is repugnant to
181 Id.
182 Id. at 685-86.
183 Id. at 686-90.
184 Id. at 692.
.8s See infra Section E.B.1 (noting differences in approach to this question among the
lower courts).
186 25 F.3d 1512 (11th Cir. 1994).
187 See id. at 1517-18.
188 Id. at 1518.
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fundamental principles of what is decent and just," and "the relative
strengths of the American and German interests."'"
As the Turner court recognized, these factors had been "developed for
the purpose of considering actions brought to enforce foreign judg-
ments," even though Turner itself did "not contain an enforcement ac-
tion."I90 But the court reasoned that these factors might still be relevant
in Turner "because a judgment has been rendered in the parallel pro-
ceeding" in Germany. 191 When a court is considering whether to defer to
foreign parallel proceedings, it might indeed be relevant to take into ac-
count the stage of those proceedings-for example, whether the com-
plaint has just been filed versus whether the foreign court has already
issued a decision. But taking the stage of foreign proceedings into ac-
count does not require looking behind the foreign decision to evaluate
its potential enforceability.
By nonetheless incorporating judgment recognition factors into its ab-
stention analysis, the Turner court introduced two difficulties: First, it
did not consider what future courts might make of this set of criteria in
cases that raised only one of these two issues (recognition of a foreign
judgment or deference to a foreign parallel proceeding). And second, it
elided the distinction between federal and state law in the court's analy-
sis. While the Turner court did acknowledge that a judgment enforce-
ment action would normally be decided under state law, it avoided grap-
pling with that tension by asserting that federal and state law pointed in
the same direction in Turner.192
Both difficulties took root in the Eleventh Circuit's later decision in
Belize Telecom, Ltd. v. Government of Belize.1 93 The parties in Belize
Telecom were not debating whether to stay U.S. proceedings in light of
foreign parallel proceedings, like in Turner. Rather, Belize Telecom con-
cerned whether the U.S. court was bound by a Belize court's prior inter-
pretation of the parties' contract. 194 If raised properly by the parties, this
dispute might have been framed as a question of res judicata. Instead,
the Eleventh Circuit raised it sua sponte as an application of "the princi-
189 Id. at 1519, 1521. The last factor is not from the standard test for recognizing foreign
judgments and is problematically broad. See infra note 240.
190 Turner, 25 F.3d at 1519 n.11.
191 Id.
192 See id. at 1520 & n.12.
193 528 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008).
194 See id. at 1304.
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ples of international comity"l9 and invoked Turner to help it decide
whether "abstention is appropriate when a foreign court has already ren-
dered a decision on the merits of the case."' 96
Because Turner had incorporated the judgment recognition factors in-
to a federal abstention doctrine, Belize Telecom analyzed these factors as
a matter of federal law,1 97 even while again acknowledging that state
law would normally apply to the question of judgment recognition. 98
Further, because it relied on Turner, the Belize Telecom court applied
the Colorado River factors, 199 even though the case involved no ongoing
parallel litigation. It also took from Turner (which had taken it from
Ingersoll) the additional factor of "the relative strength of the American
and [foreign] interests."200 Such a general weighing of sovereign inter-
ests has no place in determining whether to recognize a foreign judg-
ment. Characterizing a matter of judgment recognition as one of absten-
tion, then, led the court to apply a consideration (the weighing of
sovereign interests) that is much broader than any of those traditionally
evaluated under the standard U.S. approach to recognizing foreign
judgments.
Despite the conflation and doctrinal messiness of the Eleventh Circuit
opinions, however, these difficulties nonetheless remained marginal-
more semantic than seismic-to the court's analysis in both cases. Then
came the Ninth Circuit's decision in Mujica v. AirScan, Inc.201 Mujica
involved a Colombian military raid against a Colombian village in
which seventeen civilians, including children, were killed.20 2 In addition
to suing the Colombian government in Colombia,203 survivors of the raid
filed suit in the Central District of California against two U.S. corpora-
tions, including one based in Los Angeles, over their roles in the mili-
tary operation. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first dismissed the plaintiffs'
19s Id. at 1304 & n.7.
196 Id. at 1305 & n.9 (emphasis added).
197 See id. at 1306-07.
198 See id. at 1306 n. 10. Like in Turner, the court reasoned in a footnote that state and fed-
eral law would lead to the same result in this particular case. See id.
199 See id. at 1308.
200 See id. at 1307.
201 771 F.3d 580 (9th Cir. 2014).
202 Id. at 584-85.
203 The Colombian suit led to a settlement between the government and the survivors; the
Colombian courts also found three of the military officers involved in the raid guilty of man-
slaughter. Id. at 585-86.
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federal claims based on recent Supreme Court precedent 204 and then
dismissed their state-law claims with prejudice based on a novel test for
"international comity abstention." In developing that test, Mujica drew
primarily on a different Eleventh Circuit test for international comity ab-
stention, that of Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG.20 5 While Turner
purported to analyze "(1) ... international comity; (2) fairness to liti-
gants; and (3) efficient use of scarce judicial resources,"2 06 Ungaro-
Benages purported to weigh "[1] the strength of the United States' inter-
est in using a foreign forum, [2] the strength of the foreign governments'
interests, and [3] the adequacy of the alternative forum." 2 07 Notably,
Ungaro-Benages did not further specify the content of these three con-
siderations, and it also treated the question of judgment recognition as
separate from this vague tripartite standard.208 But the Mujica court con-
flated the two issues again by drawing on Belize Telecom's list of judg-
ment recognition factors to fill in what Ungaro-Benages meant by "the
adequacy of the [alternative] forum." 209
This conflation was particularly problematic in Mujica as the case did
not involve any prior judgments between the parties (unlike in Ingersoll,
Turner, and Belize Telecom). Yet the Mujica majority concluded that the
Colombian courts were "adequate" in large part due to a Colombian
judgment that the plaintiffs had secured against a different defendant
(the Colombian government). 210 This is backwards: whether a past
judgment against the Colombian government could be enforced in U.S.
courts does not establish the future adequacy of the Colombian courts in
the plaintiffs' case against private defendants. If anything, the opposite
is true, as the Colombian judgment meant the plaintiffs were barred
from pursuing additional recovery against private parties (like the de-
fendants) in Colombian courts.2 1 1 In short, Mujica involved neither for-
eign parallel proceedings nor an existing foreign judgment between the
parties, yet it used the Eleventh Circuit's conflation of these two ques-
tions to justify dismissing state-law claims based on a loosely defined
doctrine of federal common law.
204 See id. at 590-96.
205 379 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2004). Ungaro-Benages is discussed further in Part 1H below.
206 Turner, 25 F.3d at 1518.
207 Ungaro-Benages, 379 F.3d at 1238.
208 See id.
209 See Mujica, 771 F.3d at 608.




The federal courts should take care to return to Ingersoll's analytical
clarity. The recognition of a foreign judgment must be analyzed distinct-
ly from the question of abstention. While the existence of a judgment
between the same parties might be relevant to determining whether to
defer to foreign parallel proceedings given their advanced status, that
single consideration does not require incorporating the judgment recog-
nition test into an abstention analysis.
C. Distinguishing Prescriptive and Adjudicative Comity: Statutory
Construction and Choice ofLaw
In discussing "international comity abstention," some courts have
been careful to distinguish between prescriptive comity and adjudicative
comity.21 2 The questions each type of comity addresses are distinct: pre-
scriptive comity asks whether a jurisdiction's law applies, while adjudi-
cative comity asks whether the court should hear the case in order to ap-
ply that law.213 Analyses of abstention should not be confused with
questions of prescriptive comity, which include the geographic reach of
statutes, choice of law, and the foreign-state compulsion defense (e.g.,
"true conflicts" as invoked by the Supreme Court in Hartford Fire In-
surance Co. v. Calhfornia214).
Unfortunately, the analytical structure for resolving questions of pre-
scriptive comity is itself not clear. This Section starts by describing that
structure for prescriptive comity, beginning with what is more settled
and ending with what is not. In trying to fill (or ignore) that gap, judges
have drawn on tangentially related doctrines like international comity
abstention. Though this move is understandable, it ought nevertheless to
be avoided. The second half of this Section uses a couple of recent cases
to identify the dangers of that move. When judges use international
comity abstention to address questions of prescriptive comity, they ob-
fuscate what issues they are really deciding, which in turn raises con-
212 For examples of opinions that carefully distinguish these two concepts, see Bigio v.
Coca-Cola Co., 448 F.3d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 2006); In re Marwell Commc'n Corp., 93 F.3d
1036, 1047 (2d Cir. 1996); see also JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mexico, S.A.
de C.V., 412 F.3d 418, 424 (2d Cir. 2005) (distinguishing between choice of law and foreign
parallel proceedings as distinct questions).
213 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that the "extraterritorial reach" of a U.S. statute "has nothing to do with the ju-
risdiction of the courts"); see also id. at 818 n.9 (faulting lower courts for confusing the
question of the reach of the Sherman Act with the question of abstention).
214 Id. at 764, 798.
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cerns about accuracy and accountability. And once again, this conflation
can shortchange state law, in particular the state interests embodied in
choice-of-law methodology.
Prescriptive comity is not an easy equation to solve. International law
allows countries great leeway in extending their laws to individuals and
conduct beyond their borders, 215 and it is not uncommon for countries'
prescriptive jurisdictions to overlap. This is not in itself a problem, but it
does require judges to consider whether and when their own domestic
law should give way to the legislative interests of other countries. U.S.
judges address this question through both positive and negative prescrip-
tive comity doctrines.
On the positive comity side, judges employ choice-of-law rules to de-
termine which sovereign's laws should govern a dispute. Additionally,
more narrow doctrines of prescriptive comity instruct U.S. judges to
make space for foreign laws. The act of state doctrine, for example, di-
rects judges to take as valid "the acts of foreign sovereigns taken within
their own jurisdictions."2 16
On the negative comity side, judges use canons of statutory construc-
tion like the presumption against extraterritoriality to help them identify
the geographic limits of U.S. statutes. After Morrison v. National Aus-
tralia Bank Ltd.,217 the initial steps of this analysis are clear, at least
when the plaintiffs have asserted claims under federal statutes. Under
Morrison's step one, the judge determines whether the federal statute
rebuts the presumption against extraterritoriality. If there is no clear in-
tent that the statute should apply extraterritorially, then under Morri-
son's step two, the judge determines if the asserted application of the
statute would in fact be extraterritorial by asking whether the statute's
regulatory "focus" occurred in the United States.218
But if the statute does rebut the presumption at step one-and many
statutes do-then the judge has to determine to what extent the statute
215 See Maggie Gardner, Channeling Unilateralism, 56 Harv. Int'l L.J. 297, 304-06 (2015)
(describing the recognized bases for prescriptive jurisdiction under international law while
noting how "their application in practice can be controversial if pushed too far beyond the
core zone of accepted state practice").
216 See W. S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 405, 409
(1990).
217 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
218 See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016) (summarizing
two-step inquiry from Morrison).
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extends beyond U.S. borders. 219 The outer limit of a statute's reach is in-
formed by international law: under the Charming Betsy canon, judges
presume that Congress did not intend to exceed the scope of internation-
ally recognized bases for prescriptive jurisdiction.220 As noted, however,
the permissible bases of prescriptive jurisdiction will often overlap with
those of other countries. Is there a limit to the reach of extraterritorial
U.S. statutes short of the outer bounds of international law, and if so,
how are judges to determine what that limit is?
The Supreme Court has made clear that there is a limit but has left
fairly ambiguous how judges are to identify it. In F. Hoffnann-La Roche
Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 22 1 the Court explained that it "construes ambigu-
ous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign au-
thority of other nations," based on the assumption "that legislators take
account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations when they
write American laws."222 The lower courts have not avidly followed this
direction, however, because Empagran left unclear what "unreasonable
interference" might mean.
This is where things get messy. It is not clear that the Empagran
Court knew what "unreasonable interference" meant either, beyond the
facts of that case. The new Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States suggests it provides a supplementary
principle of interpretation, the application of which varies from statute
to statute.2 2 3 Lower courts, in trying to find this limit, have drawn on a
set of factors initially developed by the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Assn 224 and
which were then incorporated into Section 403 of the Restatement
219 See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 609 (9th Cir.
1976) ("[Ilt is evident that at some point the interests of the United States are too weak and
the foreign harmony incentive for restraint too strong to justify an extraterritorial assertion of
jurisdiction.").
220 See, e.g., Hartford, 509 U.S. at 814-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (applying Charming
Betsy canon in this context); id. at 818 ("[T]he practice of using international law to limit the
extraterritorial reach of statutes is firmly established in our jurisprudence.").
221 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
222 Id. at 164 (emphasis added).
223 See Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 405 rep.
note 5 (Am. Law Inst. 2018).
224 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). The Third Circuit articulated a closely related set of fac-
tors, based largely on Timberlane, in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d
1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
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(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.225 But neither
Timberlane nor Section 403 are tools of statutory construction, which is
what Empagran calls for, and their fme-grained, context-specific inquir-
ies do not fit well the task of statutory construction, which must take
place at a higher level of generality.226 Put another way, balancing sov-
ereign interests may make sense when determining whether to apply a
statute to a given set of facts (a conflicts of law-type question), but not
when interpreting a statute as it will apply across cases.227 Indeed, this
may explain Empagran's wariness of case-by-case application of Tim-
berlane-like factors when construing federal statutes-an approach it
felt was "too complex to prove workable." 228
In the end, the correct resolution to the Empagran problem-or for
the structure of prescriptive comity analysis more generally-is beyond
the scope of this Article. Of greater present concern, the confusion gen-
erated by the Empagran gap has spilled over into the lower courts' anal-
ysis of abstention. Two recent examples may help to illustrate.
The Second Circuit in In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation,229 in dis-
missing an antitrust class action brought against Chinese vitamin manu-
facturers, struggled with an Empagran problem regarding the extent to
225 For a recent example of a court using the Timberlane factors to determine the geo-
graphic reach of an extraterritorial statute, see, for example, the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Trader Joe's Co. v. Hallatt, 835 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2016).
226 Cf. Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction Between Statutes and
Unwritten Law, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 657, 766 (2013) (noting that treating the presumption
against extraterritoriality as a question of statutory interpretation, thereby "trying to attribute
rules of applicability to the statute itself," may result in different line-drawing than if the
courts applied choice-of-law analysis in individual cases).
227 The interest-balancing approach of Timberlane and Section 403, for one thing, does not
necessarily lead to consistent results. See William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-
of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 Harv. Int'l. L.J. 101, 147
(1998). If the balance might be struck differently by different judges, it would be problemat-
ic to read that balance into the statute itself. Put a slightly different way, it is hard to connect
the outcome of an indeterminate balancing test to ex ante congressional intent, which means
treating that test as an act of statutory interpretation risks displacing the role of the political
branches in identifying what is in fact in the national interest. Cf. Stephen B. Burbank, The
World in Our Courts, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1456, 1465-66 (1991) (reviewing Gary B. Born &
David Westin, International Civil Litigation in United States Courts: Commentary and Mate-
rials (1989)) (noting that transnational cases call for "special deference to choices
made . .. by the political branches" and voicing concern that Section 403 analysis could in-
fringe on those political choices).
228 Empagran, 542 U.S. at 168. Specifically, the Court rejected application of the Man-
nington Mills balancing test, see id., which was based on Timberlane's factors.
229 837 F.3d 175 (2d. Cir. 2016), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018).
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which the (admittedly extraterritorial) antitrust laws extend to foreign
conduct. The court concluded that "because Defendants could not simul-
taneously comply with Chinese law and U.S. antitrust laws, the princi-
ples of international comity required the district court to abstain from
exercising jurisdiction." 230 Though framed as a matter of abstention, this
holding was really about prescriptive comity. 2 3 1 The bulk of the panel's
analysis focused on whether Chinese law in fact required the Chinese
defendants to collude to set prices,232 including whether the court should
defer to statements from the Chinese government about the content of
Chinese law.233 But the requirements for the foreign-state-compulsion
defense were likely not met given the intertwining of public and private
actions in a state-managed economy,2 34 and Empagran had discouraged
judges from relying on case-by-case balancing to resolve conflicts be-
tween regulatory regimes. The Second Circuit's solution was to invoke
Timberlane-like factors but to call it abstention.
Notably, there is another Second Circuit doctrine of "international
comity abstention," one drawn from Colorado River and limited to the
context of foreign parallel proceedings.23 5 Vitamin C's failure to distin-
guish that doctrine invites confusion when later judges try to reconcile
these differing approaches. On remand from the Supreme Court, it will
be important to clarify for future courts that this case is about prescrip-
tive comity, not adjudicative comity.
The Ninth Circuit similarly drew on Timberlane and Section 403
when applying "international comity abstention" in Mujica. On the one
hand, the Mujica majority insisted that the case raised a question of ad-
judicative, not prescriptive, comity; for this reason, it concluded, the
230 Id. at 179.
231 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 20, Animal
Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018) (No. 16-1220).
232 See Vitamin C, 837 F.3d at 186-92.
233 See id. at 189-92.
234 See Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 442
(Am. Law Inst. 2018). The Restatement (Fourth) clarifies that, for the foreign-state compul-
sion defense to apply, the sanctions for failing to comply with the foreign law must be se-
vere, and the person in question must have "acted in good faith to avoid the conflict." Id.
23 See Royal & Sun All. Ins. Co. of Can. v. Century Int'l Arms, Inc., 466 F.3d 88, 94 (2d
Cir. 2006) (listing a different set of eight factors); see also Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 448 F.3d
176, 178 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the district court had applied the wrong test for "inter-
national comity" because it used the Timberlane factors, which relate not to abstention, but
to "whether a court should apply United States law extraterritorially").
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"true conflict" language of Hartford Fire did not control.236 But then in
defining a new test for international comity abstention,23 7 it self-
consciously drew on Timberlane and Section 403.238 This incorporation
of choice-of-law-type factors mattered. The approach of Timberlane and
Section 403 calls on courts to identify and weigh the interests of various
sovereigns. By bringing in the Timberlane factors, the panel in Mujica
thus created space to engage in a general assessment of "the foreign pol-
icy interests of the United States," "the interests of the foreign state,"
and "any public policy interests "239 when weighing abstention. This
open-ended assessment of sovereign interests stretches the institutional
capacity of the courts and can quickly devolve into the exercise of judi-
cial intuition. 24 0
Furthermore, by converting prescriptive into adjudicative comity, the
Mujica majority displaced California's own choice-of-law rules for the
state-law claims. 2 41 And though it did acknowledge California's "signif-
icant interest in providing a forum for those harmed by the actions of its
corporate citizens," it downplayed that interest as "general," cautioning
that it "should not be overstated" given that only one of the two defend-
ants was a California corporation. 242 Even if California were to express
its interest in such cases more clearly, moreover, the court suggested
that such legislation would then run afoul of dormant foreign affairs
236 See Mujica, 771 F.3d at 598-603. In this regard, the Mujica panel was likely correct.237 See id. at 621 (Zilly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (critiquing the majori-
ty's reliance on a "novel" and "very suspect version of the international comity doctrine").
238 See Roger Alford, The Ninth Circuit's Muddled Comity Analysis in Mujica, Opinio Ju-
ris (Nov. 21, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/11/21/ninth-circuits-muddled-comity-analy
sis-mujica/ [https://perma.cc/C9DC-HBRD] (noting the "strange[ness]" in the court's rea-
soning in this regard); William S. Dodge, International Comity Run Amok, Just Security(Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/196 40/intemational-comity-run-amok/ [https://
perma.cc/PD4C-5HQ5] (same).
239 Mujica, 771 F.3d at 604, 607.
240 See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 25, at 1415-17; Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein,
Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 Yale L.J. 1170, 1191-92 (2007); Peter B.
Rutledge, Toward a Functional Approach to Sovereign Equality, 53 Va. J. Int'l L. 181, 192(2012) (noting concerns about the ability of judges in transnational cases "to make value-
laden judgments about seemingly incommensurable values"); see also Jesner v. Arab Bank,
PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1403 (2018) ("The political branches, not the Judiciary, have the re-
sponsibility and institutional capacity to weigh foreign-policy concerns.").
241 Professor Roger Alford has argued that California's choice-of-law rules would have
pointed to the application of Colombian law in Mujica. See Alford, supra note 238.
242 Mujica, 771 F.3d at 610 (quoting Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 643 F.3d
1216, 1232 (9th Cir. 2011)).
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preemption,24 3 with the result that the state's interest could never out-
weigh the general national interest in the conduct of foreign relations (as
defined by the Ninth Circuit).
To be fair, the Mujica majority was basing its foreign policy assess-
ment largely on the State Department's intervention in that particular
case, as well as the (slightly less emphatic) interventions of the govern-
ment of Colombia.24 4 Even if the majority got right the evaluation of
foreign policy in Mujica, however (and I am not sure that it did), its
broad framing of the analysis was nonetheless problematic. First, the
twelve-factor test defined and deployed in Mujica hides what the majori-
ty's analysis really turned on: the amount of deference due to the execu-
tive branch's intervention, as well as to the intervention of a foreign
government. That reliance merited greater clarity, as the question of def-
erence due to executive branch intervention on questions of comity is
important yet unsettled.245 Second, Mujica left lower courts in the Ninth
Circuit with a test for "international comity abstention"-a question of
negative adjudicative comity--derived from tests for prescriptive comi-
ty (Timberlane and Section 403) and positive adjudicative comity
(recognition of foreign judgments 246). That test does not fit well the
analysis of abstention and may mislead future judges, and their clerks,
when trying to resolve complicated questions of comity.
III. ABSTENTION IN TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION
Once attention is focused on the need for abstention in transnational
cases-putting aside questions of foreign judgment validity and the
reach of U.S. laws-what specific grounds for abstention might courts
wish to recognize? The last Part argued that courts should jettison the
label of "international comity abstention," which is too easily confused
with the broader principle of comity and leads too often to the conflation
243 See id. at 610 n.24 ("Were California to manifest a specific interest in redressing
claims arising out of the Santo Domingo incident or in Colombia's drug wars more general-
ly, its interests could well be preempted by the political branches' foreign affairs power.").
244 See id. at 609-11.
245 Compare, e.g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note 240, at 1177-78 (arguing that courts
should defer to reasonable positions taken by the Executive in private cases), with Dodge,
International Comity in American Law, supra note 13, at 2133, 2137-40 (arguing that the
executive branch should not be allowed to "dictate the outcomes of particular cases on for-
eign policy grounds"). The Ninth Circuit missed an opportunity to engage with this debate
because it buried the question behind the vague label of "international comity abstention."
246 See supra Section II.B.
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of different comity doctrines. The goal in this Part is to start to identify
more specific and manageable bases for abstention in transnational cas-
es. To that end, this Part first critiques three possible grounds for trans-
national abstention: the political sensitivity of foreign relations cases,
the complex or unsettled nature of the applicable foreign law, and the
convenience of private parties. All of these bases, I suggest, lack the ju-
dicially manageable standards that will keep them from expanding over
time.
But there are potentially legitimate grounds for abstention in transna-
tional cases that are also capable of remaining cabined. The primary
need for such restraint relates to foreign parallel proceedings. Indeed,
this has been a primary basis for the courts' invocation of "international
comity abstention," and most of the scholarly attention to transnational
abstention so far has focused on this application.247 Yet as this literature
demonstrates, the federal courts have been applying different tests for
analyzing the problem of foreign parallel proceedings. Subsection
III.B.1 suggests a unified approach to foreign parallel proceedings that
would be sensitive to the questions of doctrinal design raised in this Ar-
ticle. Regardless of the approach adopted, however, it is important for
the courts to have a clear, consistent, and tailored inquiry that stands on
its own, rather than being subsumed into broader doctrines (like interna-
tional comity abstention or forum non conveniens) that sweep in extra-
neous considerations.
The best account for the remaining cases that have invoked "interna-
tional comity abstention"-both descriptively and normatively-is as
deference to integrated remedial schemes set up by foreign governments
and that depend on all related claims being settled through the same fo-
rum. The domestic comparison might be to Burford or Thibodaux ab-
248stention, or to even narrower doctrines that recognize the need for ex-
clusive jurisdiction over a specific limited res.24 9 Subsection III.B.2
considers such a basis for abstention, as well as its possible drawbacks.
247 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 150; Jocelyn H. Bush, To Abstain or Not To Abstain?: A
New Framework for Application of the Abstention Doctrine in International Parallel Pro-
ceedings, 58 Am. U. L. Rev. 127, 130-31 (2008); Calamita, supra note 169; Gaspard Curi-
oni, Interest Balancing and International Abstention, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 621, 623-26 (2013);
Margarita Treviio de Coale, Stay, Dismiss, Enjoin, or Abstain?: A Survey of Foreign Paral-
lel Litigation in the Federal Courts of the United States, 17 B.U. Int'l L.J. 79, 80 (1999); Par-
rish, supra note 150.
248 See supra Section I.A.





I am not sanguine about basing abstention on the political sensitivity
of a particular case. Tools like the political question doctrine, act of state
doctrine, and the law of immunity already address the foreign relations
implications of transnational cases. Some courts have gone farther to al-
low dismissal even beyond cases covered by the political question doc-
trine-for example, the Eleventh Circuit in Ungaro-Benages v. Dres-
dner Bank AG. 250 In Ungaro-Benages, the court had to decide whether a
claim for Holocaust restitution was effectively barred by an executive
agreement between the United States and Germany, under which Ger-
many committed to establishing a foundation to handle Holocaust resti-
tution claims while the United States committed to encouraging (but not
requiring) its courts to treat that German foundation as the exclusive fo-
rum for resolving such claims.25 1 In concluding that the political ques-
tion doctrine did not bar the case, the Eleventh Circuit correctly noted
that "not all issues that could potentially have consequences to our for-
eign relations are [non-justiciable] political questions." 25 2 But the court
was nonetheless concerned about those foreign relations implications. In
order to affirm the district court's dismissal of the Holocaust restitution
claim in light of the executive agreement, then, the Eleventh Circuit an-
nounced a new test for international comity abstention, one that turned
on "the strength of the United States' interest in using a foreign forum,
the strength of the foreign governments' interests, and the adequacy of
the [foreign] forum." 25 3
The outcome in Ungaro-Benages was not necessarily wrong. The
problem was that it depended on a broad invocation of functional for-
250 379 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2004).
251 Id. at 1231. This was the same executive agreement that the Supreme Court held pree-
mpted a conflicting state law in American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, 539 U.S.
396, 420 (2003).
252 Id. at 1235.
253 See id. at 1237-39. In doing so, it passed over the Eleventh Circuit's existing test for
international comity abstention already set out in Turner Entertainment, drawing instead
from three Second Circuit opinions (two of which declined to abstain and the third of which
phrased its analysis in terms of standing rather than abstention). See id. at 1238 (relying on
Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998); Pravin Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco
Popular del Peru, 109 F.3d 850 (2d Cir. 1997); and Bi v. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics
Co., 984 F.2d 582 (2d Cir. 1993)).
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eign relations concerns, an approach that is difficult to cabin.2 54 Courts
generally lack the institutional capacity to make fine-grained determina-
tions about foreign sovereign interests or domestic interests in foreign
affairs. 255 As a result, reasoning based on functional foreign relations
concerns is likely to be generalized and based on intuition, not facts-
and that generalized, intuitive reasoning is prone to overexpansion.256
Thus even though the Eleventh Circuit has tried to limit Ungaro-
Benages in later opinions to "exceptional diplomatic circumstances,"2 57
the Ninth Circuit subsequently used the broad language of Ungaro-
Benages to justify a larger scope for international comity abstention in
Mujica v. AirScan, Inc.2 58
Further, if abstention based on political sensitivity is driven by the
same functional justifications that informed prudential approaches to the
political question doctrine and the act of state doctrine, permitting ab-
stention on this ground risks supplanting the Supreme Court's efforts to
cabin those other foreign-affair doctrines.259 (Indeed, the district court in
Mujica had dismissed that case based on the political question doctrine
pre-Zivotofsky I260; the Ninth Circuit avoided reevaluating that determi-
nation post-Zivotofsky I by turning instead to international comity ab-
stention.) As the Third Circuit noted in refusing to dismiss a claim based
on the same U.S.-German Holocaust restitution agreement, the Supreme
Court's warning against assuming "that every case or controversy which
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance" applies just as
much to abstention as it does to the political question doctrine. 261
234 For an alternative approach for addressing the concerns in Ungaro-Benages, see Sec-
tion UI.B.2 below.
255 See sources gathered supra note 240.
256 Cf. Gardner, Parochial Procedure, supra note 37, at 964"7 (describing risk of over-
expansion).
257 See GDG Acquisitions, LLC v. Gov't of Belize, 749 F.3d 1024, 1026 (11th Cir. 2014);
see also id. at 1030-31 (emphasizing that Ungaro-Benages was an outlier and noting the
lack of precedent supporting its approach).
258 771 F.3d 580, 603 (9th Cir. 2014).
259 See supra text accompanying notes 122-125; see also Brief of Professors of Interna-
tional Litigation as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 17-21, Animal Sci. Prods.,
Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865 (2018) (No. 16-1220) (warning that
open-ended abstention based on international comity may supplant the narrower act of state
doctrine and foreign-state compulsion defense).
260 566 U.S. 189 (2012).
261 Gross v. German Found. Indus. Initiative, 456 F.3d 363, 394 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962), in noting that the courts' virtually unflagging obli-
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Such restraint may be easier advised than implemented, however. In-
deed, the recent evolution of international comity abstention might itself
be a symptom of the Supreme Court's curtailment of the act of state and
political question doctrines. When it comes to vague but unsettling for-
eign relations concerns, the search for a judicial safety valve may be in-
evitable. A compromise might be to allow for such abstention only when
based on executive branch input. This is how the Eleventh Circuit later
tried to distinguish Ungaro-Benages.262 It is critical, however, that ab-
stention not turn solely on the executive branch's intervention: both the
act of state doctrine and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act were de-
signed to relieve the Executive Branch of the diplomatically sensitive
task of making such determinative interventions in every case. Rather, if
such a ground for transnational abstention were recognized, executive
branch intervention should be treated as a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for abstention in extraordinary cases.2 63
2. Unsettled Foreign Law
Judges should also be wary of the temptation to dismiss transnational
cases because those cases require the application of complex or unset-
tled foreign law. Dealing with foreign law is part of the typical workload
of U.S. courts.2 64 And federal judges are used to making educated as-
sessments about the uncertain law of other jurisdictions.265 Indeed, do-
mestic abstention doctrines like Pullman do not allow federal judges to
abstain solely on the basis of unsettled state law: something more is re-
gation to exercise their jurisdiction in transnational cases "is not diminished simply because
foreign relations might be involved").
262 See GDG Acquisitions, 749 F.3d at 1032.
263 My thanks to Professor Scott Dodson for suggesting this intermediate prescription.
264 See GDG Acquisitions, 749 F.3d at 1034 ("[F]ederal courts regularly interpret and ap-
ply foreign law without offending international interests."); DiFederico v. Marriott Int'l,
Inc., 714 F.3d 796, 807-08 (4th Cir. 2013) (emphasizing that U.S. courts apply foreign law
all the time and have the tools to do so); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 448 F.3d 176, 179 (2d Cir.
2006) ("While adjudication of plaintiffs' common law claims may also require some modest
application of Egyptian law, the courts of this Circuit are regularly called upon to interpret
foreign law without thereby offending principles of international comity." (citation omit-
ted)); see also Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1873
(2018) (discussing interpretation of foreign law by federal courts).
265 See, e.g., England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 426 (1964) (Doug-
las, J., concurring) ("Since Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, the federal courts under [diversity] ju-
risdiction daily have the task of determining what the state law is. The fact that those ques-
tions are complex and difficult is no excuse for a refusal by the District Court to entertain the
suit." (citations omitted)).
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quired.266 "[T]he difficulties of ascertaining what the state courts may
hereafter determine the state law to be," the Supreme Court has warned,
"do not in themselves afford a sufficient ground for a federal court to
decline to exercise its jurisdiction to decide a case which is properly
brought to it for decision. The diversity jurisdiction was not conferred
for the benefit of the federal courts or to serve their convenience."267
Even if a Pullman-like basis for abstention were to be adopted for
transnational cases, then, there would need to be an additional "plus"
factor. And that "plus" factor should not be the political sensitivity of
the case, as that concern is too easy to invoke whenever complex or un-
settled foreign law is at stake. (For example, any time the law of Coun-
try X has not been resolved, a judge might assert that it would cause fric-
tion for a U.S. court to attempt to resolve it.) Note also the rise of
certification in reducing the need for Pullman abstention domestical-
ly. 2 6 8 While certification internationally is more complicated, it is not
outside the realm of feasibility.2 69 Just as Pullman abstention has been
marginalized in domestic cases, particularly through the use of certifica-
tion, so should judges be wary of such a basis for abstention into trans-
national cases: judges have other tools for handling difficult questions of
foreign law short of avoiding those cases altogether.270
3. Party Convenience
Judges may also be tempted to take into account the challenges that
cross-border litigation poses for private parties, particularly defend-
ants.271 The difficulty is that cross-border litigation is inherently incon-
266 See, e.g., Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235-36 (1943).
267 Id. at 234.
268 See supra Section I.A.
269 See Animal Sci. Prods., 138 S. Ct. at 1875 (noting European and inter-American trea-
ties to which the United States is not a party that allow for nonbinding transnational certifi-
cation).
270 Cf. id. at 1873-74 (suggesting factors federal courts might weigh in evaluating a for-
eign sovereign's submission regarding the meaning of foreign law).
271 That the lower courts have at times included party convenience as a factor of interna-
tional comity abstention is likely the fault of Colorado River, which drew its party conven-
ience factor directly from Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), where the Court
first defined the forum non conveniens analysis. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist.
v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976). In the context of Colorado River, however, low-
er courts have "amply demonstrated the vacuousness" of this factor, and it is often ignored.
Mullenix, supra note 65, at 132-34 (gathering cases and critiquing this factor in the context
of Colorado River).
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venient, and it is never an easy calculus to determine where litigation
would be most convenient (and whose convenience should be priori-
tized).27 More fundamentally, it is worth asking whether party incon-
venience is ever an appropriate basis for declining congressionally
granted jurisdiction.2 73 To the extent that the inconvenience caused by
transnational litigation is so great as to raise a due process concern, such
due process concerns are already addressed (or could be addressed)
through other doctrines.274
Federal courts also use forum non conveniens to address party con-
venience concerns, though I have argued, along with others, that the
doctrine is not properly understood as a tool for avoiding mere incon-
venience.27 5 Indeed, many of the critiques I raise here about internation-
al comity abstention apply equally to forum non conveniens: both are
overbroad doctrines of abstention that lump too many concerns into one
poorly framed rubric.2 76 At the very least, judges should be careful to
keep forum non conveniens distinct from their analyses of other bases
for abstention in transnational cases. Some courts have been careful to
do so, 2 7 7 but others have self-consciously combined these tests, import-
ing factors from forum non conveniens into the assessment of interna-
272 See Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 37, at 421, 425--26 (discuss-
ing the difficulty of assessing convenience in transnational cases in the context of forum non
conveniens).
273 For scholars critiquing forum non conveniens on this basis, see sources gathered in
note 111 above.
274 See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (describing
reasonableness factors for the exercise of personal jurisdiction); McLachlan, supra note 131,
at 21 (arguing that doctrines for managing parallel litigation are justified by the need to en-
sure due process for parties); cf. Clermont, supra note 178, at 119 (suggesting that forum non
conveniens leads only to "multiplying costs and delays, increasing uncertainty, and facilitat-
ing discrimination against foreigners" given that the reasonableness factors within personal
jurisdiction already address extreme inconvenience).
275 See, e.g., Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 37, at 414-15 (noting
that the original purpose of the doctrine was to avoid injustice and emphasizing that "non
conveniens" translates not to "inconvenience," but to "inappropriate" or "unsuitable");
Clermont, supra note 178, at 119 (urging that forum non conveniens "should not expand into
a doctrine of inconvenience").
276 See Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 37, at 405-27 (discussing
the shortcomings of the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens).
277 See, e.g., Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 448 F.3d 176, 178-79 (2d Cir. 2006); Phila. Maca-
roni Co. v. Italpasta Ltd., No. 09-2460, 2010 WL 1568508, at *11 n.13 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20,
2010).
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tional comity abstention.27 8 The problem here is not so much that these
doctrines ask different questions, but that the factors may be doing dif-
ferent work in one doctrine versus the other.279
Ultimately, I would like to see both labels retired and replaced by a
few specific grounds for abstention in transnational cases. To the extent
that forum non conveniens is too deeply engrained in federal practice to
be retired overnight, however, judges do not need an additional open-
ended concept of "international comity abstention" to further broaden
the discretion they already have under forum non conveniens.280 Con-
sider Mujica once again in this regard. The district court in Mujica had
denied the defendants' motions to dismiss for forum non conveniens and
for transnational abstention.281 By defining a new test for "international
comity abstention" that encompassed both sets of considerations, the
Ninth Circuit was able to reach a different conclusion. The combination
of these two judge-made tests, in other words, may exaggerate the al-
ready great judicial discretion granted by each.
B. Better Bases for Abstention
In sum, political sensitivity, unsettled foreign law, and party conven-
ience should all be avoided as bases for transnational abstention because
they are too malleable and thus prone to expansive application. But there
are grounds for abstention in transnational cases that can be more pre-
278 See, e.g., Mujica, 771 F.3d at 612 n.25; Ungaro-Benages, 379 F.3d at 1238 ("Our de-
termination of the adequacy of the alternative forum is informed by forum non conveniens
analysis.").
279 For example, the adequacy and availability of a foreign forum is a threshold inquiry in
the forum non conveniens context-and a very low threshold at that. See Piper Aircraft Co.
v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 251, 254 n.22 (1981); Kevin M. Clermont, The Story of Piper: Fo-
rum Matters, in Civil Procedure Stories 199, 217-18 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008)
("[T]he way courts apply the supposed rule [of adequate and available forum] means that the
prerequisite of an alternative forum might be more a useful verbiage than a working rule.");
Gardner, Parochial Procedure, supra note 37, at 988-89 (describing how this inquiry in the
context of forum non conveniens has evolved such that "foreign fora are almost never found
to be either inadequate or unavailable"). Mujica imported that low bar into its abstention
analysis to conclude that Colombian courts were generally adequate, even though the Mujica
plaintiffs would be barred by the Colombian courts from suing the U.S. defendants. Mujica,
771 F.3d at 612-14; see also Cooper v. Tokyo Elec. Power Co., 860 F.3d 1193, 1210 (9th
Cir. 2017) (asserting analysis of this factor is the same for both doctrines).
280 Cf. Clermont, supra note 279, at 225 (critiquing forum non conveniens for raising "le-
gal- process dangers" by allowing ad hoc, murky decision making to obscure what courts are
really doing).
281 Mujica, 771 F.3d at 586-87.
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cisely defined, based on considerations that judges have the institutional
capacity to evaluate reliably. Such grounds would not raise the same
dangers of distortion. This Section explores two such grounds: deference
to foreign parallel proceedings and deference to integrated foreign re-
medial schemes.
1. Foreign Parallel Proceedings
Many of the federal cases that have invoked "international comity ab-
stention" do so in light of foreign parallel proceedings.28 2 Yet there is no
uniformity to their approach: Some courts analyze the relevance of for-
eign parallel proceedings under comity-based doctrines like internation-
al comity abstention, forum non conveniens, or lis alibi pendens; other
courts have instead employed domestic doctrines like Colorado River
Water Conservation District v. United States 283 (federal court deference
to state parallel litigation) or Landis v. North American Co.2 84 (federal
court deference to federal parallel litigation). 2 85 Courts may combine
these approaches, as well-for example, by drawing on Colorado River
to fill in the requirements of international comity abstention.286
The irony is that none of these rubrics is well-suited for addressing
the specific question of foreign parallel proceedings-and with mis-
matched rubrics comes the risk of muddled, misdirected, and mistaken
analysis.287 Both international comity abstention and forum non conven-
iens are too broad, implying a range of additional considerations that are
282 See, e.g., Dodge, International Comity in American Law, supra note 13, at 2112 ("In
most circuits, international comity abstention is simply an application to foreign proceedings
of the federal-state abstention doctrine articulated in Colorado River.").
283 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
284 299 U.S. 248 (1936).
285 See, e.g., Calamita, supra note 169, at 613-14, 671-72 (collecting cases); Parrish, supra
note 150, at 237, 248-51 (same). The most common approach, however, is that based on
Colorado River. See Dodge, International Comity in American Law, supra note 13, at 2112.
But even those courts that purport to apply Colorado River or Landis to this question have
varied in how they describe the resulting test. See Bush, supra note 247, at 129-31.
286 See, e.g., Royal & Sun All. Ins. Co. of Can. v. Century Int'l Arms, Inc., 466 F.3d 88,
92-93 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817, 820); Turner Entm't Co. v.
Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1518 (llth Cir. 1994).
287 See supra Section I.D (discussing the risks of poorly fitting rubrics); see also Calamita,
supra note 169, at 655 (concluding that because the federal courts are "doctrinally ... in the
wrong place" on the question of foreign parallel proceedings, they "are busily crafting rules
that either pander to inappropriate concerns or, perhaps worse, are unbounded by any rele-
vant meaningful principles").
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irrelevant to the question of whether to defer to foreign proceedings. 288
On the other hand, simply applying domestic precedent (like Colorado
River or Landis) ignores the procedural, substantive, and remedial dif-
ferences that exist between a U.S. court and a foreign court.289 Landis is
a particularly problematic analogy, as the presumption of jurisdictional
obligation is not implicated when a federal court defers to another feder-
al court.290 Using the label lis alibi pendens might make sense, as might
a rough but more accessible translation-something like "parallel pro-
ceedings abstention."
Another issue that has divided the courts (and scholars) is what de-
fault presumption courts should apply: Should federal courts presump-
tively allow domestic litigation to proceed despite pending parallel liti-
gation in a foreign court (akin to Colorado River), or should they
presumptively stay cases before them in deference to suits filed first in
foreign jurisdictions (akin to Landis or the civil law approach to lis alibi
pendens)?291 My preference would be for a more European-style pre-
sumption of a stay, but subject to discrete exceptions.292 Though this
presumption pulls against jurisdictional obligation, it is a limited and
manageable exception justified by concrete comity interests. First, it is
capable of remaining a cabined exception to the courts' jurisdictional
obligation-at least if labeled clearly-because it depends on a small
and readily ascertainable set of facts: Are there foreign proceedings that
288 See Calamita, supra note 169, at 672 ("There is too much baggage associated with the
Court's discussions of forum non conveniens . . . to make it likely that ... the federal courts
will draw the kind of distinctions in analysis" that would be required.); cf Gardner, Retiring
Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 37, at 451-52 (noting that international comity absten-
tion is too vague and forum non conveniens too unrelated to serve as viable doctrines for
managing parallel litigation).
289 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 150, at 232-33.
290 See, e.g., Bush, supra note 247, at 149-50.
291 Compare, e.g., Royal & Sun All., 466 F.3d at 93, 95 (applying Colorado River), and Al-
Abood ex rel. Al-Abood v. El-Shamari, 217 F.3d 225, 232 (4th Cir. 2000) (same), with
Cont'l Time Corp. v. Swiss Credit Bank, 543 F. Supp. 408, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (emphasiz-
ing preference for first-filed litigation); compare also, e.g., Calamita, supra note 169, at 674-
75 (endorsing presumptive stay), and Parrish, supra note 150, at 270 (same), with Bush, su-
pra note 247, at 131 (endorsing Colorado River approach of allowing parallel litigation to
proceed).
292 Cf Burbank, supra note 150, at 229-31, 234 (recommending that U.S. courts and rule
makers follow the European approach but with specified bases of exception); Calamita, su-
pra note 169, at 674-75 (recommending preference for first-filed cases but listing reasons
that might overcome that preference). According to Professor Jansen Calamita, U.S. state
courts that have considered the issue of foreign parallel proceedings have uniformly adopted
such a presumption of deference to pending foreign litigation.
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are "parallel," in the sense that they involve "substantially similar"
(though not necessarily identical) parties and issues? 293 Second, it would
align U.S. practice with that of many of our allies, particularly our Eu-
ropean allies, which suggests it would promote reciprocal treatment and
general goodwill.294 Third, and relatedly, it should tend to foster greater
comity over time. To the extent it aligns with the practice of major al-
lies, it increases the possibility of greater harmonization of practice
through later treaties. And to the extent it reduces the frequency of par-
allel litigation, it should decrease the need for antisuit injunctions (i.e.,
the use of injunctions to try to limit or stop litigation in a foreign court),
which can undermine comity. Finally, a presumptive stay in light of for-
eign parallel proceedings has the practical benefits of being easy to ap-
ply and avoiding duplicative judicial effort.29 5
Adopting a presumption of a stay does not, however, require a strict
"first-filed" rule. Exceptions to the presumption can address the due
process and fairness concerns that the proverbial "race to the court-
house" evokes. The trick is to frame these further exceptions narrowly
and via judicially ascertainable factors so that they do not grow over
time to displace the default rule (here, the presumption that second-filed
litigation should be stayed). Not helpful, for example, would be a gen-
eral exception allowing judges to determine which country has the
greater interest in the case-or any other formulation that devolves into
identifying and weighing sovereign interests. Better are exceptions that
turn on specific considerations that courts have the ready tools to evalu-
ate. For example, if the U.S. plaintiff can show that the plaintiff in the
foreign proceedings is not diligently pursuing the foreign case (or that
there has otherwise been an unacceptable delay in the foreign court), the
U.S. court should either deny the stay in the first instance or lift a stay
293 Defining what constitutes "parallel" proceedings is itself, however, an open question.
For courts adopting the "substantially similar" approach, see, for example, Royal & Sun All.,
466 F.3d at 94; Al-Abood, 217 F.3d at 232; Finova Capital Corp. v. Ryan Helicopters
U.S.A., Inc., 180 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 1999). For a discussion of additional options, see
Redish, Intersystemic Redundancy and Federal Court Power, supra note 17, at 1362-67 (de-
scribing possible "res judicata," "supplemental jurisdiction," and "relitigation" conceptions
of parallel proceedings).
294 See Bookman, supra note 13, at 1136 (recommending the use of foreign analogs to in-
form our understanding of what comity entails).
295 Cf. Parrish, supra note 150, at 270-71 (justifying a first-filed approach on similar
grounds).
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previously imposed, allowing U.S. litigation to proceed. 296 The U.S.
court might also consider-before imposing the stay-whether a judg-
ment resulting from the foreign proceeding would generally be enforce-
able in the United States.297 That might entail, for example, a prelimi-
nary consideration of whether the foreign court has acceptable
jurisdiction, whether its judicial system provides for due process, or
whether the foreign proceeding would offend some fundamental aspect
of U.S. public policy. 298 As in the judgment enforcement context, these
considerations would be set at a high bar, such that they could rarely be
invoked successfully.
Finally, some special categories of cases might warrant different
treatment-most notably, actions for declaratory judgments. A major
shortcoming of a strict first-filed rule is that it encourages likely defend-
ants to preemptively seek a declaratory judgment in the jurisdiction of
their choice. Where there is parallel litigation, then, involving a request
for declaratory relief, preference should typically be given to the action
filed by the "natural" plaintiff.299 For example, if the foreign proceeding
was initiated first but in the posture of a declaratory judgment action, the
default presumption (favoring a stay in deference to the foreign proceed-
ing) would be weaker, and the U.S. judge could allow the "natural"
plaintiff to continue his litigation in the U.S. court. On the other hand,
there may be times when the first-filed suit in a U.S. court is a declarato-
ry judgment action and the "natural" plaintiff has subsequently filed suit
in a foreign forum. In that circumstance, the U.S. judge should have the
flexibility to stay the first-filed declaratory judgment action in deference
to the later-filed foreign suit. Such a stay would not conflict with the
296 Cf. Burbank, supra note 150, at 222-23 (suggesting parallel litigation should be al-
lowed to proceed where the plaintiff in the first-filed case fails to advance that case);
Calamita, supra note 169, at 669 (urging the use of stays, rather than dismissals, in order to
allow judges to correct for such delinquencies).
297 For a similar approach, see Burbank, supra note 150, at 234. See also McLachlan, supra
note 131, at 62-63 (discussing a Swiss statute that allows for stays only if the resulting
judgment will likely be enforceable in Switzerland).
298 Cf. Calamita, supra note 169, at 675 (suggesting that courts, in applying a first-filed
presumption, should nonetheless "look to see whether the circumstances of the case suggest
that deference to the forum court would violate domestic public policy, prejudice the rights
of those entitled to the protection of U.S. law, or whether the facts indicate that the foreign
action was contrived to usurp the 'natural' plaintiff s choice of forum").
299 See Natuzzi Americas, Inc. v. Petrook, No. 1:12CV559, 2013 WL 6628763, at *3-*5
(M.D.N.C. Dec. 16, 2013) (modifying the test for foreign parallel proceedings in a declarato-
ry judgment action, in particular to downplay the first-filed factor where the U.S. plaintiff
sought declaratory relief only after receiving a demand letter from the foreign defendant).
2019] 119
Virginia Law Review
presumption of jurisdictional obligation, it should be noted, as declarato-
ry relief is inherently discretionary.oo
If courts were to adopt the opposite starting presumption-allowing
parallel litigation to proceed in the absence of exceptional circumstanc-
es, along the lines of Colorado River-that approach would need to ac-
commodate additional specialized tests for issues like bankruptcy, for
which courts employing a Colorado River framework have already de-
veloped a greater willingness to stay U.S. litigation based on the need to
consolidate insolvency proceedings as much as possible within a single
jurisdiction. 30 1 Having a range of modified tests for different subject
matters, however, invites more confusion and conflation. Indeed, some
courts have already conflated the bankruptcy approach with internation-
al comity abstention more broadly. Avoiding the need to do so is an ad-
ditional benefit of adopting a European-style presumption in favor of de-
ferring to foreign parallel proceedings, regardless of the subject matter.
It will take time to work out the details of a parallel proceeding-
specific doctrine. In the interim, judges should at least be clear when
their invocation of international comity abstention (or forum non con-
veniens) is premised on the existence of parallel proceedings, and they
should identify with similar clarity the test and default presumption (to
stay or not to stay) that they apply. That clarity will both aid in the de-
velopment of a more considered and narrowly tailored doctrine and min-
imize the perception that "international comity abstention" provides
broad, general grounds for declining jurisdiction in transnational cases.
300 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 150, at 227 n. 113 (noting that staying or dismissing an
action for declaratory judgment does not raise separation-of-powers concerns because the
Declaratory Judgment Act does not create rights but merely enables judicial discretion); cf.
Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286-88 (1995) (articulating a lighter standard for
abstention in declaratory judgment actions).
301 On the need for a particularly deferential approach to foreign parallel insolvency pro-
ceedings, see, for example, Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Co. of Canada v. Century Inter-
national Arms, Inc., 466 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2006); JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos
Hornos de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., 412 F.3d 418, 424 (2d Cir. 2005) ("We have repeatedly
held that U.S. courts should ordinarily decline to adjudicate creditor claims that are the sub-
ject of a foreign bankruptcy proceeding."); In re Simon, 153 F.3d 991, 998-99 (9th Cir.
1998) (describing the "philosophy" of the Bankruptcy Code's structure as "deference to the
country where the primary insolvency proceeding is located ... and flexible cooperation in
administration of assets," with the result that "the bankruptcy court must consider the status
and progress of other nations' insolvency proceedings in determining how to manage domes-
tic bankruptcies").
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2. Integrated Foreign Remedial Schemes
Even a clearly stated doctrine of abstention based on foreign parallel
proceedings, however, will leave unaddressed those cases where foreign
litigation may not yet have been commenced, but there is affirmative ac-
tion on the part of a foreign government that indicates its unique ability
to resolve the matter. Consider again in this regard the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's decision in Ungaro-Benages. A more cabined way of expressing
the concern raised by Ungaro-Benages might be as a doctrine of absten-
tion in transnational cases that is roughly analogous to Burford or
Thibodaux abstention domestically: that federal judges should stay U.S.
cases if a foreign sovereign has indicated that it is resolving a complex
set of claims through a unitary procedure, whether judicial or adminis-
trative, the success of which depends on the consolidation of claims be-
fore one forum.302
Federal procedure amply recognizes the need to address interrelated
claims within a single proceeding, whether through interpleader,303 in
tervention as of right,304 the required joinder of indispensable parties, 30 5
or even class actions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(1). 306 Burford v. Sun Oil Co. extends that idea across cases: It rec-
ognizes that there is a need to resolve some sets of claims within unified
proceedings. 307 At stake in Burford was the State of Texas's manage-
ment of the East Texas oil field, a natural resource that not only required
coordinated conservation, but also implicated "the whole economy of
the State." 308 Individual claims regarding new oil wells were "not mere
302 Cf. James E. Pfander & Nassim Nazemi, The Anti-Injunction Act and the Problem of
Federal-State Jurisdictional Overlap, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 68-71 (2013) (noting criticisms of
Burford but suggesting that the doctrine could be salvaged by similarly focusing on the need
to provide consolidated treatment of interdependent claims involving scarce resources). Note
this basis may also displace the perceived need for prudential exhaustion in transnational
cases. See Dodge, International Comity in American Law, supra note 13, at 2110-11. It
might also further alleviate any remaining need for forum non conveniens. Cf. Lueck v.
Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1144-45 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying forum non conveniens
to dismiss claims regarding an airplane crash in New Zealand in light of New Zealand's ac-
cident fund for mass disasters). See generally Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens,
supra note 37, at 429-43 (noting the declining need for forum non conveniens in light of
other procedural developments).
303 Fed. R. Civ. P. 22.
" Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
30' Fed. R. Civ. P. 19.
306 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1).
307 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
308 Id. at 319-20.
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isolated disputes between private parties," but interrelated decisions that
could result, if not properly managed, in "the irretrievable loss of oil in
other parts of the field."30 9 Where the matter is of special state con-
cern 310 and of established state expertise,311 the Burford majority con-
cluded, federal courts may stay their hand to allow unified resolution of
those claims.31 2
That idea could be extrapolated to matters of special concern to for-
eign states, where the foreign state has established an integrated remedi-
al structure to address interlinked claims. In Ungaro-Benages, for ex-
ample, the Eleventh Circuit was worried about protecting a settlement
structure meant to reach "thousands of other victims of the Nazi re-
gime." 313 As it noted, "the German government has a significant interest
in having the Foundation be the exclusive forum for these claims."314
Likewise, in Bi v. Union Carbide Chemicals and Plastics Co., the Sec-
ond Circuit dismissed a challenge to a settlement reached by the Indian
government on behalf of the thousands of victims of the Bhopal gas leak
disaster.3 15 In both of these cases, "Germany and India had powerful and
easily discernible interests in protecting their dispute-resolution systems
involving thousands of claimants from the corrosion or collapse that
would occur if [these individual] claims were handled by [U.S.] federal
courts."316 Likewise, U.S. courts might stay cases that could undercut
the administration of a foreign government's settlement fund for a mass
disaster.317 Consider, in this regard, the challenge that foreign litigation
might have posed to the centralized handling of the 9/11 first responder
309 Id. at 324.
310 Id.
311 Id. at 327.
312 Id. at 334.
313 Ungaro-Benages, 379 F.3d at 1240.
314 Id. at 1239 (emphasis added).
311 984 F.2d 582, 583 (2d Cir. 1993).
316 GDG Acquisitions, LLC v. Gov't of Belize, 749 F.3d 1024, 1032 (11th Cir. 2014) (dis-
tinguishing Ungaro-Benages and Bi from other cases that may also implicate foreign sover-
eign interests).
317 See, e.g., Peiqing Cong v. ConocoPhillips Co., 250 F. Supp. 3d 229, 232, 235 (S.D.
Tex. 2016) (dismissing claims of Chinese fishermen regarding oil spill in deference to set-
tlement fund established between ConocoPhillips and the Chinese government and adminis-
tered by China); cf. Cooper v. Tokyo Elec. Power Co., 860 F.3d 1193, 1207-09 (9th Cir.
2017) (recognizing the need for such deference to foreign compensation funds but declining
to stay or dismiss claims related to the Fukushima nuclear disaster in light of other consider-
ations).
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claims in the United States.318 A more mundane example is cross-border
bankruptcy proceedings, a context in which the federal courts have long
recognized the need for coordination with and deference to foreign
courts that have primary jurisdiction over the bankruptcy estate.319
Acknowledging that some cases discussing "international comity ab-
stention" might be better categorized under this narrower basis for ab-
stention, however, is not to suggest that all of these cases were decided
correctly. Indeed, in the absence of a clear framework, it is quite possi-
ble that U.S. judges have applied their intuitions regarding such com-
prehensive remedial schemes in an inconsistent fashion. There are risks,
too, in recognizing such a basis for abstention. The integrated foreign
remedial scheme, for example, might have been established through
self-dealing or otherwise might represent the interests not of the foreign
public but of a handful of political leaders whose pockets may be lined
by powerful defendants.3 20 Or the foreign scheme's scope of potential
claimants might be too narrow, or its process too difficult, to provide
meaningful access to justice.321 The analogy to domestic abstention, af-
ter all, is very rough: when federal courts defer to state proceedings,
they can count on those proceedings applying a familiar set of laws
through familiar proceedings, cabined by the same Constitution. Trans-
national abstention requires a much greater leap of faith. In light of these
considerations, the following should be taken only as a preliminary con-
318 See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 Wash. U.
L. Rev. 1027, 1029 (2013) (regarding "[t]he claims of first responders injured by the toxic
conditions at the site of the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center disaster," explaining
that "Congress created a comprehensive scheme for the resolution of those first-responder
claims, specifying a liability rule, preempting alternative remedies, imposing a collective
damages cap, and enacting an exclusive grant of jurisdiction to the federal court in 'the
Southern District of New York that resulted in the consolidation of more than 10,000 indi-
vidual cases before Judge Alvin Hellerstein").
319 "Comity is especially important in the context of the Bankruptcy Code" because it "fa-
cilitate[s] 'equitable, orderly, and systematic' distribution of the debtor's assets." In re
Maxwell Commc'n Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1048 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Cunard S.S. Co. v.
Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 458 (2d Cir. 1985)); see also cases gathered supra
note 301.
320 For example, the plaintiffs in Bi were collaterally attacking the Indian Government's
settlement of the Bhopal disaster based on the Government's "unacceptable conflict of inter-
est" and the plaintiffs' lack of notice and representation in the settlement proceedings. See
Bi, 984 F.2d at 584.
321 Such access-to-justice concerns might have motivated the Third Circuit in Gross v.
German Foundation Industrial Initiative, 456 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 2006), when it refused to
defer to the same Holocaust restitution fund as the Eleventh Circuit did in Ungaro-Benages.
2019] 123
cept for recognizing abstention based on integrated foreign remedial
schemes-an effort to begin a conversation, not to definitively endorse a
new doctrine.
The starting point would be, again, that federal courts should exercise
their congressionally granted jurisdiction. Along the lines of Burford or
Thibodaux abstention, however, a court might decline its jurisdiction in
an exceptional case (but would not be required to) if all of the following
conditions were met: First, there is a foreign consolidated remedial
scheme meant to address interrelated claims. Though it need not be judi-
cial in nature, something more than a run-of-the-mill settlement is re-
quired: for example, an established administrative process for accident
compensation, or a major government-negotiated and government-
administered settlement process. Second, the scheme must depend upon
the coordinated resolution of the interrelated claims-for example, due
to the limited nature of the settlement fund or disputed res,322 or perhaps
due to the inextricable interrelatedness of the claims themselves.32 3
Third, the U.S. court should ensure that the foreign sovereign to
which it would defer does in fact have a significant nexus to the under-
lying dispute-for example, that it was the location of the mass disaster
in question. This factor would not entail a comparative analysis, nor
would it be a high bar; rather, it is meant to serve as a check to ensure
that the foreign government is well-situated to assess and resolve the
claims. Fourth, the U.S. court should decline to abstain if it harbors
doubt that the foreign remedial scheme is capable of providing relief-
for example, if the foreign remedial scheme appears to lack jurisdiction
over all the relevant parties, if its processes raise serious due process
concerns, or if the fund is too limited to provide meaningful relief. This
final check does not ask the U.S. court to evaluate the foreign judicial
system writ large, but to inquire into objective limiting factors regarding
the particular case before it.
Any abstention on this basis would, again, best be treated as a stay,324
allowing the U.S. court to revisit its decision to defer in light of signifi-
322 Cf. Princess Lida of Thum & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466 (1939) (holding
that federal courts must yield jurisdiction to a state court that first acquires jurisdiction over
a particular res).
323 Cf. Burford, 319 U.S. at 324 (noting that one litigant's claim for oil allotments might
lead to "the irretrievable loss of oil in other parts of the field," to the detriment of other
rights-holders).
324 The purpose of a stay, it bears emphasizing, is to provide some flexibility for judges to
revisit the question, not to relax the initial standard. In the long run, a stay in favor of foreign
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cant delays, indications of corruption, an actual denial of fundamental
due process, or similar reasons. Finally, interventions by the U.S. gov-
ernment or foreign government to explain the scheme and the need for
consolidated treatment should be welcomed and treated as persuasive
but not decisive.325
IV. CONCLUSION
The federal courts should jettison the nascent doctrine of "interna-
tional comity abstention" in its current amorphous form. Just as there is
no one "abstention doctrine" in domestic practice, so there should not be
a blanket concept of abstention in transnational cases. To the extent
there are legitimate bases for abstention in transnational cases, those ba-
ses should be addressed through far more narrow and specific inquiries.
To embrace a broader conception of "international comity abstention"
would be to further expand the scope of the judiciary's power vis-a-vis
Congress and the states. Increasingly when it comes to transnational liti-
gation, it is the federal courts who are the final arbiter of what cases can
and cannot be heard.326 When Congress or the states are able to satisfy
all of the Supreme Court's growing requirements in framing laws that
bring transnational cases into U.S. courts, federal judges should not
claim an additional open-ended discretionary power to refuse to hear
them.
The more moderate approach advocated here, in contrast, allows
courts to flag possible comity concerns while leaving space for the other
branches to develop alternative solutions, in particular through the de-
proceedings will be functionally equivalent to a dismissal, as the final judgment of the for-
eign proceeding will likely be given res judicata effects by U.S. courts.
325 Cf Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1869,
1873-74 (2018) (holding that federal courts are "not bound to accord conclusive effect to the
foreign government's statements" regarding the meaning of its domestic laws and suggesting
criteria that courts might use in evaluating such statements). Such interventions should not
be given determinative weight as doing so would allow the executive branch (or the foreign
government) to override Congress's grant of jurisdiction. Further, strong or mandatory def-
erence to the foreign government in particular would undercut the checks regarding the ade-
quacy of the foreign scheme, which should be built into any basis for abstention along these
lines.
326 Cf Bookman, supra note 13, at 1120 (arguing transnational litigation avoidance carries
a separation-of-powers cost because it is court-driven); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Trans-
national Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1081, 1121-22 (2010) (arguing




velopment of international agreements. 327 Thus, for example, the courts'
special treatment of cross-border bankruptcies-in which U.S. courts
expressed a willingness to defer to insolvency proceedings centered in
other jurisdictions-helped foster a formal international approach that
has now been codified by Congress in Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy
Code. Even narrower subject-matter specific solutions are possible. For
example, the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear
Damage commits member countries to consolidating claims relating to a
nuclear accident in the jurisdiction where the accident occurs and estab-
lishes a common fund to pay for any resulting judgments. 328 Beyond
such subject matter-specific agreements to consolidate litigation within
a single jurisdiction, Congress might also adopt federal legislation re-
quiring deference to foreign parallel proceedings, perhaps in light of a
new Hague treaty on judgment recognition.32 9 In the meantime, the fed-
eral courts should be circumspect in-but not rigidly opposed to-
recognizing narrow circumstances in which they might need to defer to
the judicial activity of other sovereigns.
Ultimately, cross-border activity-and the disputes it generates-are
messy. The solution should not be categorical rules that attempt to draw
strict lines between U.S. interests and foreign interests, 330 but cabined
flexibility that acknowledges both the reality of overlapping interests
and the role of all component parts of our government in navigating that
overlap effectively.
327 Cf. Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 Va. L. Rev. 813, 888 (2008)
(concluding that "[u]niform procedural regulation," including abstention doctrines, "is ulti-
mately in the control of Congress"); Burbank, supra note 150, at 233 (noting Congress and
the President are competent to define judicial treatment of foreign parallel proceedings).
328 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, arts. m, X, July
22, 1998, 36 I.L.M. 1454; see also Cooper v. Tokyo Elec. Power Co., 860 F.3d 1193, 1199-
1204 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing the convention).
329 See Burbank, supra note 150, at 229, 234 n.146 (recommending federal legislation to
address problem of parallel proceedings and noting that such legislation would alleviate any
separation-of-powers concerns regarding abstention on that basis). On the renewed negotia-
tions for a treaty regarding the enforcement of judgments (which would likely address the
issue of parallel proceedings), see generally The Judgments Project, Hague Convention on
Private International Law, https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/Judgments
[https://perma.cc/3EYQ-33NC ] (last visited Apr. 4, 2017).
330 Cf. Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Scope and Limitations of the Presumption Against Extra-
territoriality, 110 AJIL Unbound 62, 62 (2016) (questioning the "sufficiency of [categorical,
territory-based rules] to address the messy and often unpredictable patterns of transnational
economic activity").
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